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ABSTRACT 
Results of early studies (eg. Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978) on the effects of 
supervisory styles on subordinates' job related tension have been contradictory. 
Subsequent studies using the contingency model to resolve these conflicting results 
have identified budgetary participation (Brownell, 1982a) and trust (Ross, 1994) as 
important moderating variables. With respect to participation, a number of prior 
studies found that a compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high 
participation was associated with better behavioural outcomes ( eg. lower job related 
tension), than other combinations of budget emphasis and participation. Yet there has 
been relatively little research to investigate why this particular combination of budget 
emphasis and participation is associated with better behavioural outcomes. 
This thesis therefore investigates a number of important issues. First, it investigates 
whether different combinations of budget emphasis and participation affect 
subordinates' propensity to create slack and job related tension differently. Second, it 
examines whether a high budget emphasis-high participation combination results in 
lower subordinates' propensity to create slack and lower job related tension than a low 
budget emphasis-high participation combination. Third, it investigates the reasons 
why a high budget emphasis-high participation combination leads to lower propensity 
to create slack and lower job related tension. 
The interaction between budget emphasis and participation was dealt with by testing a 
model on supervisory styles in a high participatory environment. Norway was 
hypothesised to have a high participatory environment because of its high power 
distance culture and its highly centralised and formalised industrial relations systems 
which emphasise democratic work environment. Moreover, its highly homogeneous 
population and society are likely to result in a small diversity within its national 
culture, which in turn, leads to a smaller range of participation. Hence participation in 
Norway is expected to be not only high, but also widespread. This means that a high 
budget emphasis situation in Norway is similar to a high budget emphasis and high 
participation combination, whilst a low budget emphasis situation in Norway is similar 
to a low budget emphasis-high participation combination. This allows a high budget 
emphasis-high participation (Norway) situation to be compared with a low budget 
emphasis-high participation (Norway) situation. Consequently, a high budget 
emphasis situation in Norway, which is similar to a high budget emphasis and high 
participation situation, is therefore expected to be associated with lower job related 
tension than a low budget emphasis in Norway. 
In order to investigate the reason why a high budget emphasis-high participation 
combination promotes lower propensity to create slack and job related tension, path 
analytical models, which investigate the intervening effects of participation, trust and 
organisational commitment on the relationship between budget emphasis and 
propensity to create slack/job related tension, were developed. Testing these models in 
Norway permits two issues to be investigated. These are: (i) the interaction between 
budget emphasis and participation affecting propensity to create slack/job related 
tension, and (ii) the intervening effects of participation, trust and organisational 
commitment on the relationship between budget emphasis and propensity to create 
slack/job related tension. 
The results support the expectation that Norwegian managers generally enjoy very 
high level of budgetary participation. Second, they also support the expected 
significant negative relationship between budget emphasis and job related tension. 
Third, a high budget emphasis situation in Norway (high participatory) was found to 
have only a small and insignificant direct effect of job related tension. Instead, there is 
11 
a strong indirect effect through trust. Based on these results, it is possible to conclude 
that a high budget emphasis and high participation combination will lead to lower job 
related tension. The reason for this is partly because this combination promotes higher 
trust between the subordinates and their superior. Trust, in tum, leads to lower 
subordinates' job related tension. These results provide valuable insights which help to 
explain why a compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high 
participation, found by a number of prior studies with the contingency model, can lead 
to better behavioural outcomes than other combinations of budget emphasis and 
participation. 
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CHAPTER! 
Introduction 
Introduction 
An important area of management accounting research is the relationship between 
budget based evaluation styles and participation and its effect on subordinates' 
behaviours 
including job related tension and propensity to create slack. Management accounting 
research has gradually evolved from a focus on budgetary control to a broader 
organisational view. It has concentrated on explaining the most efficient managerial 
evaluation style by examining the inter- and intraorganisational relations affecting the 
use of accounting, and how members of the organisation utilise the information and 
control system to benefit themselves or their organisation. A number of studies have 
also recognised the dysfunctional effects of budgetary slack, which has been the focus 
of a considerable number of studies in management accounting research. Finally, it 
has also long been recognised that "enriched" jobs include factors such as job 
satisfaction, jobs containing more variety, autonomy, feedback and participation, 
which have led researchers to include variables, and combination of variables, that 
when experienced in a positive fashion, should benefit the whole organisation and 
consequently its members. This thesis thus seeks to further explore the relationships 
between budget emphasis and budgetary participation and its effect on propensity to 
create slack and job related tension by including two other variables, namely trust and 
organisational commitment to bring -about a more integrated model to explain the 
effects of evaluative styles on subordinates' behaviours. 
1 
Motivation for the study 
The impact of performance evaluative styles on subordinates' attitudes and 
performance has been the focus of much management accounting research interest. 
The first systematic study in this area by Hopwood (l 972) indicated that an inflexible 
approach in the use of accounting data to evaluate subordinates' performance was 
associated with subordinates' job related tension and other dysfunctional behaviour. 
Otley (l 978), however, was unable to replicate these results. Since then, a stream of 
studies has examined a variety of variables, which could influence the relationships 
between performance evaluative styles and a variety of behavioural outcome 
variables. Whilst the results of these studies are not always consistent, the large body 
of evidence accumulated has nevertheless provided some general patterns of these 
relationships. 
In particular, a remarkably consistent pattern appears to occur with respect to the 
effects of budgetary participation. Brownell (1982a) argued that for beneficial 
behavioural consequences to occur, an evaluative style with a heavy reliance on 
accounting performance measures (high budget emphasis) should be complemented 
with a high extent of budgetary participation. His results indicated that a compatible 
match of a high budget emphasis and high participation was associated with high 
managerial performance. Since then, a number of studies have found remarkably 
consistent results with this particular combination of budget emphasis and 
participation on a variety of behavioural outcomes in different environments. These 
include Brownell & Hirst ( 1986) in low task uncertainty situation for job related 
tension; Brownell & Dunk (1991) in low task difficulty situation for managerial 
performance; Harrison (1992) in Australia and Singapore for job satisfaction and job 
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related tension; Dunk (1993) in Australia for budgetary slack; Lau et al. (1995) in 
Singapore for managerial performance; Lau & Tan ( 1998) in Australia and Singapore 
-· 
for the financial services sector managerial performance; Lau & Eggleton (1998) in 
Australia and Singapore for propensity to create slack; and Lau & Buckland ( 1999) in 
Norway for managerial performance. 
This thesis attempts to extend on these relatively consistent results by examining a 
number of previously unexplored issues. First, as participation is one of the two 
crucial variables in the relationship, it is unclear if the results of prior studies were not 
confounded by the lack of control over the effects of national culture and other 
societal influences on this variable. Some researchers ( eg., Hofstede, 1980; Brownell, 
1982b; Harrison, 1992) have suggested that national culture could affect the extent of 
budgetary participation and that high participatory environment could be found in 
certain cultures. For instance, Harrison ( 1992) suggests that a high participatory 
environment, where participation is widespread among members of the society, could 
exist in a low power distance culture. This means that a study undertaken in a low 
power distance culture may have respondents who are generally experiencing 
relatively high participation in their organisations. As low participation is rare in such 
a cultural environment, respondents described as having low participation may still 
enjoy relatively high participation. Hence, a situation classified, as a /ow participation 
situation in a low power distance culture could, in reality, still be a high participation 
situation or be equivalent to a high participation situation in a different cultural 
environment. Consequently, results of studies undertaken in a particular cultural 
environment, for instance in high participatory cultures should be interpreted with 
caution and their results may not be generalisable to other cultural environments. This 
means that control over the impact of culture on participation is crucial for studies 
investigating the effects of evaluative styles on behavioural outcomes. For this reason, 
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even though there have been many studies which examined the effects of evaluative 
styles, there is a concern that the impact of the cultural environment on participation 
may have been overlooked (Harrison, 1992). Hence, there is a need to undertake 
further such studies which provide some control over the participatory environment. 
With respect to this thesis, since it was previously noted that a high budget emphasis 
evaluative style should be complemented with high participation, it follows that if a 
high budget emphasis evaluative style is employed in a high participatory environment 
such as in Norway, favourable behavioural outcomes should be expected. An 
examination of the impact of performance evaluative styles on behavioural outcomes 
in such a cultural environment would provide valuable evidence to consolidate the 
theory in this research area pertaining to high participatory situations. The results of 
such a study will only be generalisable to high participatory environment. But it would 
be valuable and meaningful evidence to organisations operating in high participatory 
cultural environments in the design and implementation of their control systems. 
Moreover, the selection of Norway for study is also important in another aspect. 
Norway, a country within the Nordic cultural region (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland) and located in continental Europe, which whilst very important economically, 
has largely been overlooked by management accounting researchers (Lau & Buckland, 
1999). Hence, the results of this thesis will not only extend the area of research 
relating to the behavioural consequences of supervisory evaluative styles, but may also 
provide interesting research insights into the control systems of a previously 
unexplored Nordic cultural environment. 
Whilst the expectation that beneficial behavioural outcomes will be associated with a 
combination of high budget emphasis and high participation is relatively well 
established, it remains unclear as to why this particular combination is generally found 
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to be better (in terms of favourable behavioural outcomes) than other combinations of 
budget emphasis and participation. This thesis proposes that the extent of trust brought 
about by the combination of high budget emphasis in a high participatory environment 
is responsible for the favourable subordinates' behavioural outcomes. The positive 
association between participation and trust has been suggested by some researchers 
(eg., Meadow et al., 1959; Read, 1962; Parloff & Handlon, 1966). It is plausable that 
increased communication is likely to reduce suspicion and mistrust. Similarly, Ross 
( 1994, p. 630) found trust to be important in high budget emphasis situations. He 
suggests that subordinates are likely to find evaluative styles based on relatively 
"objective verifiable accounting measures" are easier to interpret and hence more 
trustworthy than relatively subjective and ambiguous nonaccounting performance 
measures which are difficult to interpret and subject to a "superior's biases and 
idiosyncrasies". To date, the role of trust in a high budget emphasis and high 
participatory environment has remained untested. The results of such a study may 
provide valuable insight which helps to explain why a combination of high budget 
emphasis and high participation is associated with functional behaviour. 
The importance of organisational commitment 
Another variable of interest to studies examining slack and job related tension is 
organisational commitment. Recent interest on organisational commitment 1s 
attributable to the recognition of the important role organisational commitment plays 
in employees' attitudes and performance. Organisational commitment has mostly been 
a major focus in studies of organisational behaviour, which have concentrated on 
explaining the antecedents and consequences of organisational commitment. 
According to Zahra ( 1984, p. 26); the common antecendents of organisational 
commitment are background (ie., age, sex, race, education), organisational (ie., work 
5 
experience, leadership styles), personality and attitudinal. These variables determine to 
varying degrees the efficiency of the organisation by explaining the underlying factors 
-
for "efficient" workers. This thesis will further explore the relationship among budget 
based evaluation styles, participation, propensity to create slack and job related 
tension by suggesting that organisational commitment may have an intervening effect 
in the model. 
Organisational commitment has also been examined in the context of managerial 
accounting. However, empirical research is rather limited. The first study was 
conducted by Nouri (1994) who reported that organisational commitment and the 
managers' propensity to create slack are negatively related. A later study by Nouri & 
Parker ( 1996), integrated organisational commitment and budgetary participation 
when examining their effects on slack. Most of the existing literature on budgetary 
slack creation is grounded in agency theory propositions and argue that participation 
gives the subordinate a better opportunity to introduce slack into the budget (Young, 
1985; Lukka, 1988; Dunk, 1993) leading to a positive relationship between 
participative budgeting and budgetary slack. However, Nouri & Parker suggested that 
subordinates with strong organisational commitment would take advantage of their 
budget influence to pursue organisational goals, whereas subordinates with low 
organisational commitment would use their budget influence to primarily pursue self-
interest. In other words, the level of organisational commitment experienced by the 
subordinate will determine his/hers likelihood of creating slack. Their findings 
supported their hypotheses that an inverse relationship between participation and slack 
exists for individuals with strong organisational commitment, whereas a positive 
relationship between participation and slack exists for individuals with weak 
organisational commitment. 
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In a recent study, Nouri & Parker (1998) examined organisational commitment as an 
intervening variable when testing the relationship between budgetary participation and 
job performance. They found that budgetary participation affects job performance 
indirectly via organisational commitment and budget adequacy. 
Other studies (eg., Rhodes & Steers, 1981; Welsch & LaVan (1981; DeCotiis & 
Summers, 1987) also provide evidence of a positive link between employee 
participation and organisational commitment. However, studies involving 
organisational commitment have mostly concentrated on testing positive outcomes, ie 
job performance or job satisfaction. These studies (eg. Aranya et al., 1982; Norris & 
Niebuhr, 1983; Meixner & Bline, 1989; Pozanski & Bine, 1997) examined this 
relationship on professional accountants. This thesis will provide further extension as 
it will include slack creation and job related tension. 
The lack of empirical evidence regarding trust 
• Omitted from studies on supervisory evaluative styles is the variable of trust. For 
many years it has been recognised as an underlying phenomena in managerial 
effectiveness. A few attempts to correlate trust and managerial effectiveness have not 
been able to find any significant results (eg., House, 1967; Dunnette & Campbell, 
1968). However, Zand ( 1972) succeeded in determining such a relationship. However, 
generalising his results to other settings imposes difficulties. 
Later studies ( eg., Simmons, 1981) also suggest that trust is a prerequisite for 
effective, humane and efficient organisations. Recently, Ross (1994) examined trust as 
a moderating variable on the relationship between budget emphasis and job related 
tension. He found that trust has ·a moderating effect on job related tension. 
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Consequently, this thesis is motivated to apply the notion of trust developed in Zand's 
( 1972) study to other formal (statistical) circumstances. 
The integration of budget emphasis. budgetary participation. organisational 
commitment and trust 
The above discussion indicates that a considerable number of researchers have studied 
the impact of budget emphasis on slack and behavioural outcomes, such as job related 
tension. Other studies have also examined the effectiveness of budgetary participation. 
Whilst organisational commitment has been the subject of interest for mainly 
organisational studies, it has not been examined extensively in management 
accounting research. To date no study has integrated budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation, organisational commitment and trust to examine their effects on slack 
creation or job related tension. 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis is also motivated by the lack of prior studies in this 
area which include trust into their models. Several researchers have mentioned the 
notion of trust without systematically accounting for it. For instance, Lau & Eggleton 
( 1998) mentioned the importance of trust in the relationship between a subordinate 
and a superior. They believed that subordinates will not create slack in order to not 
jeopardise the level of trust the superiors have in them. Other researchers (eg., 
Merlinger, 1956; Read, 1962) suggested that trust will increase an organisation's 
internal communication, especially between the subordinate and the superior. This 
thesis will therefore integrate these variables into two different models. The model in 
figure 1.1, show the relationships among budget emphasis, budgetary participation, 
trust and organisational commitment and their affects on slack and job related tension. 
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This thesis therefore examines the intervening effects of trust, budgetary participation 
and organisational commitment on the relationship between budget emphasis and 
propensity to create slack/job related tension in a high participatory environment. The 
model in Figure 1.1 allows the hypothesised intervening effects to be observed. 
Norway was chosen as a surrogate for a high participatory environment because of its 
highly centralised and formalised industrial relations systems which emphasises 
democratic work environment (Johansen, 1985) and its low power distance culture 
(Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Lau & Buckland, 1999), which promotes high participation. 
The Norwegian environment therefore allows the interaction between budget 
emphasis and high participation to be observed. Hence testing the model in Figure 1.1 
in Norway permits the observation of (i) the interaction effects of budget emphasis 
and high participation; and (ii) the intervening effects of trust and organisational 
commitment to be observed within an integrated model. It also allows Brownell's 
(1982a) study to be combined with that of Ross ( 1994 ). Whilst examining the 
interaction between budget emphasis and trust, Brownell had overlooked the 
intervening effect of trust. Similarly, whilst examining the intervening effects of trust, 
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Ross had overlooked the moderating effects of participation. This thesis incorporates 
the effects of both of these variables into and integrated and more comprehensive 
model. 
Finally, this thesis is also motivated by the need to investigate the role of trust on the 
important relationship between budgetary participation and subordinates' attitudes and 
behaviour. Prior studies have suggested that budgetary participation is an important 
predictor of subordinates' behaviour and attitudes ( eg., Milani, 1975; Ken is, 1979). 
However, according to Chenhall & Brownell (1988), the results in this research area 
are fraught with inconsistencies partly because of the failure of prior studies to 
consider the possibility that there may be no direct relationships between budgetary 
participation and the outcome variables. They argued that "there is no theoretical 
argument which can support simple, direct effects of participation on job satisfaction 
or performance. Instead, the effects of participation, if any, are indirect and are 
conveyed to outcome criteria via some intervening constructs which links the 
variables." (p. 225-226). They found role ambiguity to be an important intervening 
variable and concluded that "it is possible, indeed likely, that other variables can add 
to the explanation of the indirect path between participation and criteria" (p. 232). 
This thesis therefore provides further examination of another plausible intervening 
variables, namely, trust and organisational commitment, which may mediate the 
relationship between participation and subordinates' attitudes. The model to 
investigate this proposition is incorporated in the model in Figure 1.1. 
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Purpose of study 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, this thesis attempts to develop and test 
empirically a theory on how the four predictor variables of budget emphasis, 
budgetary participation, trust and organisational commitment affect the two dependent 
variables of job related tension and the propensity to create slack. Second, this thesis 
attempts to provide empirical evidence on the behavioural impact of control systems 
from Norway, a country located in continental Europe, which whilst very important 
economically, has largely been ignored by management accounting researchers (Lau 
& Buckland, 1999). Hence, the results of this thesis will not only extent the area of 
research relating to the behavioural consequences of supervisory evaluative styles, but 
may also provide interesting insights into the control systems of a previously 
unexplored Nordic cultural environment. 
Aims of study and research questions 
The focus of this thesis is to examine how budget emphasis, budgetary participation, 
organisational commitment and trust affect job related tension and propensity to create 
slack. The following are the research questions explored in this thesis: 
( 1) Does Norway have a high participatory environment? 
(2) Does budget emphasis affect job related tension and subordinates' propensity 
to create slack in the Norwegian environment? 
(3) Are the relationships between budget emphasis and job related 
tension/propensity to create sfack a direct one or indirectly through the 
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intervening variables of (a) budgetary participation and trust; and/or (b) 
budgetary participation and organisational commitment? 
( 4) Does budgetary participation affect job related tension and subordinates' 
propensity to create slack? 
(5) Are the relationships between budgetary participation and job related 
tension/propensity to create slack a direct one or indirectly through the 
intervening variables of (a) trust; and/or (b) organisational commitment? 
(6) Will the models developed for this study (see Figure 1.1) provide evidence to 
explain the extent of subordinates' job related tension and propensity to create 
slack and the reasons why these relationships occur? 
(7) Will the theory pertaining to the impact of evaluative styles and budgetary 
participation on subordinates' behaviour be generalisable to the Nordic 
cultural region? 
Definition of variables 
Four independent and two dependent variables are used in this thesis. The dependent 
variables are the propensity to create slack and job related tension. The independent 
variables are budget emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment 
and trust. 
The propensity to create slack 
The propensity to create slack refers to the extent of subordinates' attitude toward 
slack which is the extent of intentional understatement of the subordinate's 
performance capability built into the budget by the subordinate to make budgeted 
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targets easier to attain (Lau & Eggleton, 1988). The instrument used to measure the 
propensity to create slack was developed by Onsi's (1973). 
Job related tension 
Job related tension refers to tension arising from psychologically stressful 
circumstances in the job environment (Kenis, 1979). 
Budget emphasis 
Budget emphasis refers to the degree of reliance on accounting performance measures 
to assess the performance of subordinates. A high budget emphasis occurs when a 
superior adheres rigidly to accounting performance measures to evaluate their 
subordinates' performance. Conversely, in situations with low budget emphasis, 
superiors use non accounting performance criteria to evaluate their subordinates' 
performance. 
Budgetary participation 
Budgetary participation refers to the degree of participation and/or influence a 
subordinate has when setting budgets, which will be used as a criterion for the 
evaluation of subordinates' performance. 
Organisational commitment 
Organisational commitment refers to three critical aspects of the relationship between 
the individual and the employing firm. The first aspect refers to identification with and 
attachment to the organisation and concern with its future. The second aspect refers to 
the employee's desire to maintain his or her membership in the organisation. The third 
refers to the effort expended by the individual to help achieve the goals of the 
organisation (Zahra, 1984). 
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Trust 
Trust refers to interpersonal acceptance and openness of expression (Zand, 1972). 
Hypotheses 
The major hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
The extent of budgetary participation among Norwegian managers is high. 
Budget emphasis is negatively associated with job related tension/propensity 
to create slack in the Norwegian high participatory environment. 
Model One 
Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension/propensity to 
create slack through ( l) trust and (2) budgetary participation. 
Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on job related tension/propensity 
to create slack through trust. 
Model Two 
Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension/propensity to 
create slack through (l) organisational commitment and (2) budgetary 
participation. 
Budgetary participation has ari indirect effect on job related tension/propensity 
to create slack through organisational commitment. 
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Method 
A questionnaire translated from English to Norwegian was administered to three 
functional heads from l 00 randomly selected manufacturing companies in Norway. 
Path analysis was used to examine systematically the direct, indirect or spurious 
effects of the hypothesised relationships. 
Chapter outline and organisation 
This thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 surveys critically the relevant literature pertaining to relevant studies on 
budget emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment, as well as trust 
and their effects on propensity to create slack or job related tension. 
Chapter 3 examines the underlying theories and formulates the hypotheses. The 
theories concerning the direct effects of budget emphasis/budgetary participation, 
budgetary participation/trust, budgetary participation/organisational commitment are 
first presented. This is followed by a discussion on the indirect effects of budget 
emphasis/slack or job related tension, and budgetary participation/slack or job related 
tension via trust and organisational commitment. 
Chapter 4 discusses the research methods used to collect the data and the reasons for 
the choice of nation, organisations and respondents. In addition, an outline and 
justification of the instruments used to measure the variables are presented in this 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5 presents the results of the study. These include the response rate of the 
questionnaire survey, the descriptive statistics of the variables measured, an 
assessment of the reliability of the measurement instruments, and finally, the results of 
the hypotheses tests. 
Finally, chapter 6 provides a conclusion to the findings of this thesis, the limitations 
inherent in this study and suggestions for future research in this area of management 
accounting research. 
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CHAPTER2 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
Over the past five decades, researchers have examined the effects of budgets on 
subordinates' job related attitudes and performance. Empirical evidence suggests that a 
high emphasis on budgets in evaluative style may have a negative impact on 
subordinates' job related tension and increase subordinates' dysfunctional behaviour. 
Job related tension may be defined as dissatisfaction, constant worrying about the job 
situation and distrust with the evaluation system, whereas dysfunctional behaviour 
may be defined as budgetary slack creation and decision-making according to the self 
interest of the individual rather than the organisation (Argyris, 1952; Hofstede, 1968; 
Lowe & Shaw, 1968; Schiff & Lewin, 1968; Onsi, 1973; Kenis, 1979). 
In addition to studies concentrating on resolving the issue of ascertaining which 
performance criteria the subordinates either perform better, experience higher job 
satisfaction or reduced tension, or higher propensity to create slack, some studies have 
also included variables not related to budget based performance criteria. These include 
organisational commitment and trust. Following these studies, this thesis examines the 
relationship between ( 1) budget emphasis, budgetary participation, trust, slack and job 
related tension, and (2) budget emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational 
commitment, slack and job related tension. As such the literature in these areas will be 
reviewed critically to provide an insight into the work that has been undertaken in 
these areas. Based on these insights, it may be possible to ascertain how further 
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research should progress. This will provide the motivation and direction on how this 
thesis can further extend and contribute to this area of research. 
This chapter will thus review the relevant literature pertaining to the issues of this 
study, and will include the following sections: 
(i) Superior evaluative styles. 
This section is reviewed because superior evaluative styles have consistently shown 
by prior studies to have a significant impact on organisational commitment, budgetary 
slack creation and job related tension. 
(ii) Budgetary participation. 
This section is reviewed because prior studies have shown participation to have both a 
favourable and an unfavourable impact on job specific outcomes, such as job related 
tension and budgetary slack creation. 
(iii) Trust. 
This section is reviewed because trust is a crucial variable in this thesis. Since this 
thesis is motivated by the lack of management accounting studies involving trust, the 
literature review comprises studies that may explain the importance of including trust 
to studies on supervisory evaluative styles. 
(iv) Organisational commitment. 
This section is reviewed because of the recent recognition of the importance of 
organisational commitment in organisational and management accounting research. 
Since most of the existing literature involving organisational commitment is found in 
organisational studies, this section comprises mostly prior studies stemming from the 
organisational literature. However, the emphasis is given to those recent studies in 
management accounting involving organisational commitment (also referred to in the 
section of budgetary slack creation). 
(v) Budgetary slack creation and propensity to create slack. 
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Two dependent variables are examined in this thesis, namely propensity to create 
slack and job related tension. As the literature on budgetary slack is quite extensive 
and prior studies have found strong links between superior evaluative styles, 
budgetary participation and organisational commitment on the one hand, and 
budgetary slack creation on the other, budgetary slack will be reviewed extensively as 
a separate section. The literature relating to job related tension is included in the other 
sections. 
Finally, the chapter will discuss the implications of the literature review and 
summarise the issues to be examined in this study. 
(i) Studies on Superiors' Evaluative Style 
As early as 1952, Argyris examined the effects of superiors' evaluative styles on 
subordinates' behaviour. He has been regarded as the initial explorer, as he was the 
first to report that in organisations where budget emphasis was high, subordinates 
clearly engaged in dysfunctional behaviour. He interviewed both operating and 
accounting personnel in four manufacturing companies to identify their feelings 
towards the use of accounting measures (budgets) by superiors to evaluate 
subordinates' performance. He found that subordinates felt that that budgets were used 
by superiors as a pressure device, a motivating factor and a means of isolating and 
improving problems. He reported that such subordinates' feelings were derived from 
three main factors, ( 1) the propensity of supervisors to emphasise the need to meet the 
budget, (2) the increasing of budget standards as soon as they were met, and (3) the 
inflexible and uncompromising nature of the budget documents which failed to 
disclose the real reasons for the budget variances. Consequently, there was higher 
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tension, frustration, resentment, suspicion, fear and mistrust amongst subordinates 
when superiors used budgetary information to evaluate their performance. (Argyris, 
1952). 
Argyris proposed budgetary participation as a possible moderating variable of 
supervisory style. According to Briers & Hirst ( 1990), his study provided a milestone 
in behavioural accounting research as "it went beyond simply examining alternative 
uses of accounting information in performance evaluation. Importantly, it was a 
comprehensive study, rich in theoretical, as well as empirical, content" (p. 376). 
Argyris' (1952) findings were later supported by Hofstede (1968), who conducted a 
study of six manufacturing plants. He found that high budget emphasis resulted in 
lower job satisfaction, more stress and anxiety. Also, consistent with Argyris ( 1952), 
he found the adverse effects led to dysfunctional behaviour amongst the subordinates, 
such as absenteeism and interpersonal conflicts. 
Other studies found similar results. Lowe & Shaw ( 1968) researched the sales 
budgeting process in a retail chain of approximately 400 shops. They found that when 
management used budgets to evaluate their subordinates' performance, the 
subordinates (in this case the sales managers) took advantage of their positions and 
manipulated accounting figures. In addition, they also found that, in some cases, 
budgetary slack was created when superiors emphasised budgets as a means of 
performance. Onsi (1973) looked further into the effects on budgetary slack. In a study 
of 32 managers, he found that 80% of the managers were involved in slack creation 
when there was evidence of high budget emphasis. 
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These studies are important as they provide the support for a relationship between 
budget emphasis and job related tension and slack with budgetary participation and 
-
trust as intervening variables. Basically, a high budget emphasis evaluative style 
should be complemented by a high extent of budgetary participation, which reduces 
mistrust and hence leads to lower job related tension and a lower propensity to create 
slack. 
Hopwood ( 1972) undertook the first systematic empirical study on the relationship 
between the use of accounting data and dysfunctional behaviour. He examined cost 
centre managers from a large Chicago manufacturing company. He related 
dysfunctional behaviour to three different styles of performance evaluation. 
• The first is the Budget-Constrained (BC) style, where a high emphasis is placed 
on the subordinates' ability to continually meet budget targets when evaluating 
their performance. 
• The second is the Profit-Conscious (PC) style, which involves a more flexible 
style of budget use. More specifically, the importance of the budgetary 
information is retained, but one is also able to recognise its shortcomings. 
• The third, the Non-Accounting (NA) style, is a style where the accounting data 
are not important for evaluating performance. 
Hopwood found that under the Budget-Constrained style (high budget emphasis), 
subordinates experienced higher job related tension, a poorer relationship with their 
superiors, and were more inclined to engage in dysfunctional behaviour compared 
with subordinates evaluated under the Profit-Conscious or Non-Accounting style. 
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Since Hopwood did not systematically examine managerial performance in his study, 
Otley (1978) extended Hopwood's research by examining the effects of alternative 
evaluation styles on managerial performance. Following suggestions from Baulmer 
(1971) and Bruns & Waterhouse (1975), Otley examined unit managers with 
independent production units, which would better enable him to isolate the effects of 
supervisory styles. Whilst he followed Hopwood's definitions of evaluative styles, his 
findings did not support Hopwood's findings. 
Odey's inability to support Hopwood's findings led to his suggestion that a high 
budget emphasis style could improve managerial performance. He explained the 
differences in the results by questioning the realism or accuracy of budgets. For 
instance, he argued that actual performance is likely to be closer to budget when the 
budget is set realistically, and superiors would emphasise budget standards for 
performance evaluation only when the standards were perceived to be realistic. 
Due to Hopwood's and Odey's contradicting results, other researchers extended the 
research on budgetary control with emphasis on a contingent approach. Otley ( 1978) 
suggested that other contingency variables such as the types of organisations, the size 
of the firms, the economic environment, and the shared norms and values within the 
organisation and within the society would better explain the effects of budgetary 
control. Some of these factors were already examined by Hopwood ( 1973) and Hayes 
( 1977), and their results suggested that as organisations were increasingly exposed to 
the environment, the use of accounting information for evaluation purpose could not 
capture adequately the performance of subordinates. 
Hirst (1981) was the first to continue· the research based on Otley's study. Hirst built 
on Otley's ( 1978) suggestion that task interdependence could explain the divergence 
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between Hopwood's (1972) results and his results. Otley studied profit centres that 
were independent of each other whereas Hopwood studied cost centres in an 
integrated manufacturing company. As neither Otley nor Hopwood measured task 
interdependence, Hirst included task uncertainty as a moderating variable. He argued 
that subordinates may have no incentive to improve their performance when there is a 
low (high) reliance on accounting performance measures in low (high) task 
uncertainty situations. 
Task uncertainty is defined as an individual's beliefs on the completeness of cause-
effect knowledge of the task performance (Hirst 1981, p. 599). Hirst hypothesised that 
a medium to high (medium to low) budget emphasis minimises dysfunctional 
behaviour in situations of low (high) task uncertainty. This may explain Hopwood's 
(1973) and Otley's (1978) contradicting results. It is probable that Hopwood may have 
examined departments characterised by high task uncertainty whereas Otley may have 
examined independent subunits characterised by low task uncertainty. 
Hirst (1983) conducted an empirical study to test his hypothesis by surveying part-
time students (who were full-time middle-level managers) from four universities in 
Sydney. He found a positive (negative) relationship between job-related tension and 
budget emphasis for high (low) task uncertainty situations. These results indicate that 
a high reliance on incomplete accounting performance measures in high task 
uncertainty situations increases disagreement about evaluation styles between 
subordinates and superiors, which in turn, increases job-related tension. 
Task uncertainty as a moderating variable was also tested by lmoisili (1985). He 
included role stress as an intervening variable, in addition to dependent variables such 
as performance and dysfunctional behaviour. However, he was unable to find any 
23 
significant results. A possible explanation may be due to the hardship the sample 
organisation was experiencing at the time of his research. 
Govindarajan ( 1984) attempted to reconcile the conflicting results of Hopwood ( 1973) 
and Otley ( 1978) by examining environment as a contingent variable. He based his 
study on the proposition that organisational effectiveness depends upon the existence 
of a match between organisational control and its environment. He suggested that 
Hopwood's and Odey's results were characterised by different levels of environmental 
uncertainty. He defined environmental uncertainty as the unpredictability in the 
actions of the customers, suppliers, competitors and regulatory groups that comprise 
the external environment of business units. Following Hirst's ( 1981) contingency 
framework, he argued that a moderate to low (high) budget emphasis combined with 
high (low) environmental uncertainty would lead to increased performance. 
Govindarajan tested his hypotheses with a sample of 58 general managers from eight 
Fortune 500 companies in America, and found that environmental uncertainty has a 
significant moderating effect on the relationship between budget emphasis and 
performance. He suggested that his findings could explain the differences in the 
results of Hopwood and Otley, as it was possible that different degrees of 
environmental uncertainty existed in their studies. He suggested that Otley's sample 
could be operating under stable environmental conditions, whereas the interdependent 
unit studies by Hopwood faced greater environmental uncertainty based on 
Thompson's ( 1967) argument that environmental uncertainty increases when task 
interdependence increases. 
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Another variable that has been examined to bring further closure to the Hopwood 
(l 973) and Otley (l 978) conflict is the role of technology. Brownell & Merchant 
(1987) considered the role of technology by arguing that a high product 
standardisation provides a greater opportunity to accurately identify cost/volume 
relationships, which would in tum affect adjustments to the budget. Hence, the use of 
flexible budgets for evaluation purposes is more appropriate than a similar use of 
static budgets. Brownell & Merchant examined their proposition by studying 201 
production managers in the electronics industry and found support for their 
hypotheses. 
(ii) Studies on Budgetary Participation 
With regard to the importance of budgetary participation, Brownell (1982) made an 
important contribution to the resolution of the conflicting findings of Hopwood (1972) 
and Otley (1978), when he examined the moderating effect of budgetary participation 
on the relationship between budget emphasis and job performance. He explained 
Hopwood and Otley's results with the principles of operant conditioning and balance 
theory. He suggested that a high budget emphasis is appropriate when subordinates 
have the opportunity to negotiate the criteria against which their performance is 
assessed. In contrast, a low budget emphasis is appropriate when there is a low level 
of participation. He tested his hypotheses with a sample of 48 cost-center managers in 
a San Fransisco manufacturing company and found results that supported his 
hypotheses. 
Hirst (1987) and Dunk (1989) later replicated Brownell's (1982) study. Hirst ( 1987) 
studied a property development firm and found no significant interaction between 
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budget emphasis and participation. Dunk (1989) conducted a cross-sectional study of 
26 companies and found that high (low) budgetary participation together with high 
(low) budgetary emphasis reduces performance. Bottger & Hirst (l 988) who also 
examined the impact of participation, found that participation caused a reduction in 
job stress where budget emphasis is high but found no such effect where budget 
emphasis is low, which is consistent with Hopwood's ( 1973) study. 
Brownell & Hirst (1986) attempted to link the Brownell (1982) and Hirst (1983) 
studies by examining the three-way interaction between budget emphasis, task 
uncertainty and budgetary participation. They believed that Brownell's (1982) result 
would hold in low task uncertainty situations but not in high task uncertainty 
situations as participation in high task uncertainty situations is deemed necessary for 
managers to enhance performance, regardless of the level of budget emphasis. Their 
results support their hypotheses ~at compatible combinations of high (low) 
participation and high (low) budget emphasis decrease job-related tension in low task 
uncertainty situations. However, they were unable to find any significant results for 
the dependent variable of performance. They suggested the possibility of cross-
national differences (one Australian and one U.S.), or some other intervening 
variables, which could have affected their results. 
Brownell & Dunk (1991) concentrated on task difficulty when they re-examined 
Brownell & Hirst's ( 1986) study. They suggested that task difficulty rather than task 
uncertainty might be of importance in order to generalise Brownell & Dunk's ( 1986) 
results. Task difficulty is defined as the ability to specify input/output relations, and 
whether there is any standard procedure or manual for subordinates to follow in order 
to successfully carry out a task. The other dimension, task variability, is considered to 
be less important in order to generalise Brownell's ( 1982) study. For instance, in cases 
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of high level of task variability, tasks could still be relatively simple and 
straightforward. Thus, Brownell's ( 1982) results can be generalised across different 
-
levels of task variability. Their results supported their proposition, that is, where task 
difficulty is low, low (high) participation accompanied by low (high) budget emphasis 
is associated with effective managerial performance. However, they found that when 
task difficulty is high, high participation, regardless of the level of budget emphasis, is 
associated with effective managerial performance. 
Hwang ( 1989) and Harrison ( 1992) provided further insights into the study of 
superiors' evaluative styles and budgetary participation by introducing national culture 
as a contingent variable. Hwang ( 1989) studied the effect of power distance on the 
relationship between budgetary participation and motivation. Harrison (1992) 
examined the moderating effect of national cultures on the relationship between 
budget emphasis and both job satisfaction and job-related tension. He conducted a 
cross-cultural study to ascertain whether Brownell's ( 1982) results can be generalised 
across nations with different cultures. He suggested that culture might influence the 
perceived appropriateness of participation. He used Hofstede's (1980) cultural 
dimensions when categorising nations according to what would most likely affect 
participation. The cultural dimensions used were power distance and individualism. 
Since Brownell's (1982) findings were based on a sample from the U.S., they were 
expected to be generalised to nations similar to the U.S., in other words, nations with a 
low power distance and high individualism, like for instance, Australia. However, 
Harrison (1992) also expected Brownell's findings to be applicable to high power 
distance and low individualism nations, like Singapore, because these nations like the 
U.S., have one dimension (low · individualism) which favours subordinates' 
participation and another (high power distance) which is unfavourable to subordinates' 
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participation. His results supported his hypothesis that the participation effects on the 
relationship between budget emphasis and the dependent variables of job related 
tension and job satisfaction, could be generalised across nations with high (low) power 
distance and low (high) individualism. His results were also consistent with those of 
Brownell (1982) and Brownell and Hirst (1986), that matching increasing level of 
budget emphasis with increasing levels of participation would, in both nations 
(Australia and Singapore), reduce job-related tension. 
In addition, Harrison ( 1990, 1993) also examined the moderating personal variable of 
authoritarianism to the relationship between budget emphasis and the dependent 
variables job related tension and job satisfaction. He hypothesised that high budget 
emphasis is preferable in high power distance nations as these nations place a high 
reliance on accounting performance measures in evaluative styles. According to 
Hofstede (1984) subordinates in high power distance nations are very dependent and 
expect their superiors to behave autocratically and be non-consultative. Hence a 
leadership style based on high budget emphasis would be desirable. The same would 
apply to low individualism nations. In contrast, subordinates in low power distance 
nations will prefer a low budget emphasis as the latter leadership style is categorised 
by a non-representative leadership style in the evaluation process. Subordinates in a 
low power distance nation emphasise the need to take part in decisions that concerns 
them. Hence, a consultative leadership style is most appropriate. Harrison ( 1990, 
1993) was able to support his hypotheses regarding the interaction between national 
culture and budget emphasis on job related tension and job satisfaction. However, he 
found no significant result for the three-way interactions between budget emphasis, 
culture and personality affecting job satisfaction. 
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Lau et al. (1995) used Harrison's (1992) framework for a study on national culture. 
They extended Harrison's study by examining the three-way interaction between 
budget emphasis, budget participation and task characteristics (task uncertainty and 
task difficulty) affecting job-related tension and managerial performance. They 
surveyed Singapore, and drew their sample from functional heads of manufacturing 
companies. Their results gave further support to those of Brownell and Dunk ( 1991) 
that high budgetary participation, irrespective oflevel of budget emphasis, in high task 
difficulty situations will improve managerial performance. Also, compatible 
combinations of high budget emphasis and high participation were associated with 
improved managerial performance in low task uncertainty situations. More 
importantly, Lau, et al. (1995) found further evidence to support Harrison's (1992) 
findings that the effect of budgetary participation on managerial performance can be 
generalised between high (low) power distance and low (high) individualism nations. 
Their results also indicate the possibility of generalising Harrison's results to 
manufacturing industries and across functional areas. 
Finally, a recent paper by Lau & Buckland (1999) also supports the generalisation of 
research results on the effects of supervisory styles across cultures. The study was a 
replication of the Lau et al. (1995) study. However, the research site was Norway, a 
continental European nation with a Nordic culture. They found that the three-way 
interaction between budget emphasis, budgetary participation and task difficulty has a 
significant effect on job performance of Norwegian managers. In addition, when the 
results were compared with those of Singapore (drawn from Lau et al.'s study), the 
Norwegian managers, like the Singaporean managers, performed best when budget 
emphasis and budgetary participation were both high in /ow task difficulty situations, 
and performed worst when budget emphasis and budgetary participation were both 
low. In high task difficulty situations, Norwegian managers performed best when 
29 
budget emphasis was high, as opposed to Singaporean managers who performed best 
when participation was high. 
(iii) Studies on Trust 
Despite repeated mention of trust in the organisational and management literature, 
relatively little theoretical explication or empirical examination of trust in relation to 
supervisory styles and its effect on job outcomes is found in the management 
accounting literature. However, the study by Ross ( 1994) is one excemption. He is the 
first managerial accounting researcher to systematically examine trust. He argued that 
trust may moderate the ~ffect Qf superior's evaluative style on the level of job related 
-- - -------------------·- -
t~_!l!i_()_n. Specifically, he argued that trust may mediate the relationship b~tween 
budget-constrained and the profit-conscious style and job related tension. However, 
since the non-accounting performance evaluative style is ambiguous, subordinates will 
experience anxiety irrespective of trust due to the ambiguity of an evaluative style 
based on subjective criteria. Ross found that trust moderated the effects of the 
performance evaluative styles on job related tension, but only for the budget 
constrained and profit conscious styles. 
Trust has b_~en widely recognised as an important condition to facilitate stable social 
---· -- ·------·· -----~ •, 
relationships. Merlinger (1956) and Read (1962) suggest that trust may increase an 
organisation's internal communication, especially between superiors and subordinates. 
It has also __ b~~~-~~~~~~t~ _that trust is essential for effective problem solving in groups 
( eg., Meadow et al., 1959; Parloff & Hand Ion, 1966), and that trust is a prerequisite 
for effective and efficient organisations ( eg., Simmons, 1981; Ouchi, 1981 ). In a study 
on trust and managerial problem solving, Zand (1972) provided an extensive model of 
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trust and its interaction with information flow, influence, and control. He isolated the 
problem solving exercise by studying the relationship in a group setting amongst 
managers of a large, international electronics company. The model conceptualises 
trust by transforming one's inner trust into behaviour that is trusting through 
------ ---· 
information, influence and control. The hypotheses derived from the model were 
tested by a group exercise. Two groups were given identical factual information about 
a difficult problem, and one group was briefed to expect trusting behaviour whilst the 
other group was briefed to expect untrusting behaviour. Zand found that there were 
highly significant differences in the effectiveness between the high-trust and the low-
trust groups in the clarification of goals, the reality of information exchanged, the 
~~ope of search for solutions, and the commitment of managers to implement 
solutions. Consequently, trust appears to be a significant explanatory variable in 
enhancing managerial problem solving. 
With regard to the effect of trust on the performance of the individuals in the 
organisation, Robinson ( 1996) found that trust had a mediating effect on the 
employee's contributions to the firm. With regard to the effects of budgetary slack 
creation, Dunk ( 1997) reported that the relationship between participation and slack is 
a rather complex one. His study indicated that personal factors are implicated in 
influencing managerial behaviours (p. 660). Lau & Eggleton (1998) also mentioned 
the notion of trust. They believed that subordinates will not create slack in order to not 
jeopardise the level of trust their superiors have in them. 
In conclusion, these studies suggest that trust is an important factor affecting the 
..__ ___ , __ 
relationships between evaluation styles, participation and subordinates' behaviour. Yet 
there seems to be a dearth of research studies on the effects of trust in management 
accounting research. This gap in the accounting literature provides the motivation for 
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this thesis to undertake a study on the intervening effect of trust on the relationship 
between evaluative styles and subordinates' behaviour. 
iv) Studies on Organisational Commitment 
Organisational commitment refers to an employee's willingness to exert effort in the 
organisation. With respect to studies concerning organisational commitment and its 
effect on job specific outcomes, the literature is characterised by conflicting results. 
For instance, Mowday et al. (1974) found that employees' attitudes towards their 
organisations were related to job performance. They investigated the relationship 
between performance (based on work units) and employee attitudes towards their 
organisations among female clerical workers in a bank. They reported that in branches 
rated high in performance, the workers experienced a higher level of attitudes toward 
both the branch they were working for and the larger organisation they were part of, 
whereas workers in low- and medium-performing branches had a lower level of 
similar attitudes. 
In contrast, Steers ( 1977) could not detect a relationship between organisational 
commitment and performance. His results were inconclusive as he only found an 
association in two out of possible five situations. In a study of junior-level and senior-
level staff accountants, Ferris ( 1981) found mixed results for the relationship between 
organisational commitment and performance. For the junior-level sample, 
performance was found to be influenced by a willingness to exert effort, whereas for 
the senior-level sample, performance was found to be influenced by a desire to 
maintain membership (p. 323). However, as both categories are part of the definition 
of organisational commitment, it is possible to conclude that Ferris found relative 
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strong support for a relationship between organisational commitment and 
performance. 
Another study by Welsch and LaVan (1981) indicates that organisational commitment 
is also related to job satisfaction and communication in organisations. They examined 
organisational commitment and its relationship to different variables, such as 
demographic characteristics, job satisfaction, job characteristics, professional 
behaviour and organisational climate. In their study of 149 upper and middle 
managers of a large Medical Center, they found organisational commitment to be 
strongly related to job satisfaction (satisfaction with work and satisfaction with 
promotion) as well as participation (when the organisational climate was perceived to 
be participative). An important implication of their findings is that in order to increase 
the level of commitment in the organisation, different strategies will need to be 
evaluated, such as the various components of organisational climate, power, 
teamwork, and role conflict and role ambiguity (p. 1087). 
Jamal ( 1985) suggested that organisational commitment acts as a moderator between 
job stress and job performance. He argued that individuals with different levels of 
organisational commitment might perceive job stress differently. Since individuals 
with low organisational commitment have only limited feelings of loyalty toward the 
organisation, they may perform only at a marginal level. He found marginally 
significant results to support his hypothesis. 
A number of other studies involving organisational commitment have addressed the 
question of which casual relationship exists between organisational commitment and a 
number of other variables, such as job satisfaction. Job satisfaction has been reported 
to be both an antecedent and a consequence of organisational commitment. Whilst 
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Gregson ( 1992) found that job satisfaction is an antecedent to organisational 
commitment, Poznanski & Bline (1997) found the opposite casual relationship, that 
-
the level of organisational commitment experienced by a subordinate is directly 
related to his/hers level of job satisfaction. The latter result is also in accordance with 
the findings ofDeCotiis & Summers's (1987) study. 
Only a few studies have considered the role of organisational commitment in research 
on superiors' evaluative styles. Collins et al. (1995) examined the relationship between 
evaluative styles and organisational commitment by surveying 344 non-supervisors in 
a not-for-profit organisation. They found that management style based on budget data 
was positively and directly related to organisational commitment, whereas the profit-
conscious and budget-constrained styles were only indirectly related to organisational 
commitment. 
The relationship between organisational commitment and participation was examined 
by both Rhodes & Steers (1981) and by Nouri & Parker (1998). Rhodes & Steers 
found that participation in decision making is significantly related to organisational 
commitment in cooperatives, as these organisations will face a higher level of 
commitment than conventional organisations. Nouri & Parker (1998) examined 
organisational commitment, as well as budget adequacy, as intervening variables in 
the budgetary participation - job performance relationship. They surveyed 139 
American managers and supervisors from large multi-national corporations. They 
found that budget participation affects job performance indirectly via budget adequacy 
and organisational commitment. 
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(v) Studies on Budgetary Slack 
The literature pertaining to the effects of superiors' evaluative styles and participation 
on budgetary slack is quite extensive, and also quite equivocal. For instance, with 
respect to budget emphasis, different results were obtained by Onsi (1973), Collins 
(1978) and Merchant (1985). Onsi (1973) found a positive relationship between 
budget emphasis and slack. He examined the proposed relationship by surveying 107 
managers from 7 large-size, multinational U.S. corporations. His results indicated that 
there is a significant relationship between managers' attitude toward an authoritarian 
top management budgetary control system and budgetary slack. Cammann (1976) 
reported similar findings as Onsi when he examined the effects of subordinates' 
participation in decision making and job difficulty on their responses to different uses 
of control systems by their superiors. He drew his sample from a large private utility, 
where the respondents were managers at different levels of the organisation. 
Specifically, Cammann investigated the effects of different styles of uses of control 
systems on so called "defensive subordinate responses", which may be interpreted to 
include budgetary slack creation. He found that the use of control systems (ie budget 
emphasis) for reward allocation resulted in defensive subordinate responses (ie 
budgetary slack creation). 
Collins (1978) examined the relationship amongst several behavioural variables 
affecting individual responses to budgets. Although he found evidence of budgetary 
slack, he was not able to support Onsi's ( 1973) findings with regard to the relationship 
between budget pressure and slack creation. 
Merchant ( 1985) conducted a study to investigate how managers' propensity to create 
slack is affected by the budgeting system. He hypothesised that propensity to create 
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slack is positively related to the importance placed on meeting budget targets. His 
findings showed that propensity to create slack increases "if a tight budget requires the 
managers to make frequent tactical responses as not to incur budget overruns" (p. 
207). Lal et al. (l 996) who replicated Merchant's (1985) study, were unable to find 
any significant results. Based on these mixed results, later researchers examined the 
effects of budgetary participation on the relationship between budget emphasis and 
slack. 
Empirical evidence regarding the effects of budgetary participation on slack is even 
more inconsistent. Some researchers found the effect of budgetary participation 
associated on slack to be positive (eg., Young, 1985; Lukka, 1988), whilst others 
found it to be negative (eg., Onsi, 1973; Merchan~ 1985; Govindarajan, 1986). Young 
(1985) tested the effects of participation on budgetary slack in an experimental study. 
He found that a subordinate who participates builds in budgetary slack, and that slack 
is attributable to the subordinate's risk preferences. He also included information 
asymmetry in his study, but was unable to find any significant effect on slack. 
Lukka (1988) provided an extensive theoretical framework in an attempt to gain a 
wider understanding of the concept of budgeting biasing. The theoretical framework 
was divided into two parts, the explanatory model of 'slack' at the individual level, and 
the organisational model for 'slack'. The explanatory model suggested that three 
different intentions, namely, resource intention, performance evaluation intention, and 
motivation intention explain the reasons why budgetary biasing exists. The 
organisational model suggested that "budgetary bias may have either an intensifying 
or a dampening influence on conflicts in negotiations" (p. 298). His results provide 
support for his theoretical framework. Amongst the implications of his findings was 
the importance of the performance evaluation intention to explain the major part of 
36 
budgetary slack creation. In addition, he found that the degree of participation was 
positively related to the level of budgeting bias created. 
The study by Dunk (1993) is important as he was the first to link budget emphasis, 
budgetary participation and information asymmetry to resolve the issue of when 
subordinates are likely to create slack. He hypothesised that when participation, 
budget emphasis and information asymmetry were all high, slack would be high. He 
drew his sample from a random selection of 118 managers from a total of 61 
manufacturing companies. His results showed that the relation between participation 
and slack is contingent upon budget emphasis and information asymmetry. Further, 
his findings indicate surprisingly that when budget emphasis is high, participation 
reduces slack. Due to his surprising results Lau & Eggleton (1998) provided and tested 
an alternative theory to explain the conflicting results. 
Lau & Eggleton ( 1998) theorised that subordinates in high budget emphasis-high 
participation situations may not create slack because "they are likely to place greater 
utility on the long run maintenance of participation privileges and the opportunities 
they afford to both gain information from the superior and to influence the level of 
budgetary targets" (p. 3). This theory was based on prior studies which focused on the 
interaction between budget emphasis and budgetary participation (Brownell, 1982; 
Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Brownell & Dunk, 1991; Harrison, 1992; Lau et al., 199 5). 
Further, Lau & Eggleton ( 1998) suggested that subordinates in a high information 
asymmetry situation may not create slack if they fear that slack creation may 
undermine their superiors' trust in them. As a result, they hypothesised that the extent 
to which subordinates find participation useful for their purpose will be dependent on 
the three-way interaction between budget emphasis, participation and information 
asymmetry. They tested their theory by examining the proposed three-way interaction 
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on a cross-cultural sample of l 03 Australian and Singaporean managers, and found 
support for their hypotheses. 
These studies are important as they indicate that budget emphasis and participation are 
related to slack creation. Additionally, these are suggestions that trust may be an 
important variable in affecting the extent of slack creation. However, to date, the role 
of trust on slack creation appears to been left untested despite the large number of 
prior studies investigating slack. Hence, this omission provides the motivation for this 
thesis to examine systematically the role of trust in slack creation. 
Another variable, which may affect slack creation, is organisational commitment. 
Most of the existing literature on budgetary slack creation is grounded in agency 
theory propositions. Some researchers argue that participation gives the subordinate a 
better opportunity to introduce slack into the budget (Young, 1985; Lukka, 1988; 
Dunk, 1993 ). Nouri ( 1994) studied the effects of the motivational factors of 
organisational commitment and job involvement to ascertain the level of a manager's 
propensity to create slack. He posited that "managers who are highly committed to 
organisational goals and values should have low levels of propensity to create 
budgetary slack because they understand the dysfunctional impacts of budgetary slack 
on the organisation" (p. 290). He examined his proposal on 139 managers from a large 
multinational organisation. His results indicated that for managers with high 
organisational commitment, job involvement was associated with decreased levels of 
slack, whereas for managers with low organisational commitment, job involvement 
was associated with an increased propensity to create slack. 
In a later study, Nouri & Parker (1996) extended Nouri's (1994) study be examining 
the interaction between budgetary participation and organisational commitment 
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affecting budgetary slack. They posited that in a participatory budget, subordinates 
with strong organisational commitment would use their budgetary influence to reduce 
-budgetary slack to benefit the organisation. In contrast, subordinates with low 
organisational commitment would use they budgetary influence to increase slack to 
secure favourable budget evaluations. Their results support these expectations. These 
results indicate that there is considerable support to include organisational 
commitment as an important variable in the study of subordinates' propensity to create 
slack. 
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Implications of Literature Review 
The literature review provides a number of important insights into the relationships 
between superior's evaluative styles and subordinates' behaviour, such as job related 
tension and slack creation. It indicates that this research area has been the focus of 
much research work, extending as far back to the early fifties. The continuing stream 
of studies undertaken recently indicates that it is still an important and contemporary 
area of research. This is not surprising as budget constitutes probably the most 
important report of management accountants and the use of budget for performance 
evaluation remains a crucial aspect of management accounting even in contemporary 
highly competitive and complex operating environment. 
The current interest in the use of nonfinancial performance indicators for performance 
evaluation does not mean that studies on evaluative styles are no longer relevant. Note 
that whilst nonfinancial performance indicators are important, they are not intended to 
displace financial indicators. Rather, they are intended to complement the financial 
performance indicators. Note that financial performance indicators remain as one of 
the four key groups of performance indicators in the Balanced score card developed 
by Kaplan & Norton (1992). Moreover, nonfinancial indicators as performance 
evaluation criteria are not radically different from the superiors' evaluative styles that 
were examined by those prior studies included in the literature review. The use of 
nonfinancial indicators as performance indicators is in many ways the same as low 
budget emphasis evaluative style, which emphasises nonaccounting or nonfinancial 
performance indicators. This therefore means that many of the results of prior research 
on superior's evaluative styles are applicable to contemporary organisations. This 
suggests that there is a strong justification to continue to focus research effort and to 
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extend on the area of supervisory evaluative styles so that a coherent theory can be 
developed for this important management accounting area. 
However, whilst much research effort had been expended in this area, the literature 
review indicates that much remains to be done. There is clearly a need to undertake 
further research to explain many of the conflicting, surprising and unexplained results 
of prior studies. For instance, the literature review indicates that the effects of budget 
emphasis on slack creation can be positive (Onsi, 1973; Cammann, 1976) or negative 
(Merchant, 1985). Similarly, with respect to the effects of budgetary participation on 
slack creation, they can be negative (Onsi, 1973; Cammann, 1976; Merchant, 1985), 
insignificant (Collins, 1978) or positive (Young, 1985). Such results suggest the need 
to re-examine the relationships among the variables. It is plausible that some of the 
variables may be intervening rather than moderating variables. For instance, whilst 
most prior studies have considered budget participation to be a moderating variable in 
the relationships between budget emphasis and subordinates' behaviour, the results of 
some prior studies ( eg., Brownell & Dunk, 1991; Lau et al., 1995) indicates that it is 
probable that budgetary participation may be an intervening variable. The theory for 
this expectation will be discussed further in the next chapter. Hence, the literature 
review indicates that the area of the impact of supervisory style on subordinates' 
behaviour is relatively complex, involving a number of variables in complex 
relationships that need to be investigated further. 
Additionally, the literature review also indicated that whilst some variables have been 
subjected to frequent investigation (eg., participation, task and environmental 
uncertainty, national culture), other variables, which are likely to affect the 
relationships between budget emphasis and subordinates' behavior have remained 
largely untested. The t:terature review indicates that few prior studies have 
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systematically investigated these relationships, particularly with respect to trust (Ross, 
1994). More importantly, the literature indicates that few studies have attempted to 
-
incorporate these variables into a single integrated model. 
Hence, the literature review indicates the need to examine a number of issues. First, 
whilst there seems to be a consistent pattern relating to the beneficial consequences of 
a compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high participation, it is unclear 
whether these results are generalisable to the Nordic cultural region where high 
participation is the norm because of their low power distance culture and their 
centralised and formalised industrial relations systems which emphasise democratic 
work practices (Lau & Buckland, 1999). Second, it seems that there has been no 
studies undertaken to investigate why a compatible combination of high budget 
emphasis and high participation is associated with beneficial behavioural outcomes. 
Hence, this gap in the literature needs to be addressed. Third, there is a need to 
consider whether participation is an intervening instead of a moderating variable 
(Brownell, 1982) in the relationships between budget emphasis and subordinates' 
behaviour. Fourth, trust and organisational commitment should be included in the 
relationships. Fifth, the issue of whether trust and organisational commitment are 
moderating or intervening variables should also be investigated. Sixth, as the literature 
review indicates that studies are often fragmented and variables which are related are 
often not integrated into a single model, a model should be developed to integrate the 
variables of budget emphasis, participation, trust, organisational commitment, job 
related tension and propensity to create slack. Such a model is likely to provide better 
insights into the complex relationships among these variables. It will also address a 
concern of Chen hall & Brownell ( 1988) that there may be number of intervening 
variables, apart from role ambiguity, which may affect the relationship between 
budgetary participation and behavioural outcomes. 
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The literature review also indicates that almost all studies undertaken in the area of 
superiors' evaluative styles were undertaken in Anglo-American and Asian nations. 
- . 
None were undertaken in continental Europe in general and the Scandinavian region in 
particular. This suggests that some important regions were generally overlooked by 
management accounting researchers. Hence, in spite of the vast bodies of evidence 
built up in this research area, it remains unclear if any of this evidence is generalisable 
to continental Europe and the Scandinavian region. Note that these regions are very 
important, in terms of economic and social indicators and are among the most 
industrialised and developed countries in the world. Hence, research evidence from 
these regions is crucially needed to assist in the design and implementation of control 
systems in these regions. 
In conclusion, the literature suggests that the area of research pertaining to supervisory 
evaluative styles and budgetary participation constitutes a very important and heavily 
research area in management accounting. It suggests that this area of research is one of 
the main and current management accounting research areas. Brownell & Dunk ( l 99 l, 
p. 703) described this research area as "the only organised critical mass of empirical 
research work in management accounting" and Lindsay & Ehrenberg (1993, p. 223) 
described it as "one of the relatively few areas in management accounting where there 
has been any sequence of repeated studies". Whilst conflicting results among these 
studies do exist, there has nevertheless been an accumulation of a wide body of 
research of evidence suggesting some general patterns on how these variables affect 
subordinates' behaviour. Consequently, further research will help to contribute to the 
understanding of this important area of management accounting. 
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Conclusion 
The literature review provides important insights into the complex relationships 
between superior's evaluative styles and subordinates' behaviour. These insights have 
provided this thesis with not only the motivation to undertake further research in this 
important area, but also the theories to develop the hypotheses to be tested. These 
theories will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER3 
Theoretical Development and Hypotheses Formulation 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical development of the hypotheses tested in this 
thesis, along with the suggested models. It provides the theories linking the direct 
effects and indirect effects of budget emphasis, budgetary participation, trust, 
organisational commitment, slack creation and job related tension. Specifically, it will 
discuss the relationships between budget emphasis/budgetary participation, budgetary 
participation/trust, budget emphasis/organisational commitment, budgetary 
participation/organisational commitment, trust/slack, trust/job related tension, 
organisational commitment/slack, organisational commitment/job related tension, 
budget emphasis/slack, budget emphasis/job related tension, budgetary 
participation/slack and budgetary participation/job related tension. 
This thesis argues that the relationships between budget emphasis and slack/job 
related tension may be indirect through budgetary participation and trust (see model 
one in Fig. 3.1, page 56). This study will also examine the direct and indirect effects of 
budget emphasis through the intervening variables, budgetary participation and 
organisational commitment, on slack/job related tension (see model two in Fig. 3.2, 
page 67). 
Before the hypotheses are developed, it is necessary to discuss the concepts of the 
variables examined. These are: (I) budget emphasis, (2) budgetary participation, (3) 
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trust, (4) organisational commitment, (5) propensity to create slack, and (6) job related 
tension. 
Concept of Budget Emphasis 
Budget emphasis is defined as the extent to which superiors rely on or emphasise pre-
specified budget targets when evaluating their subordinates' performance. A high 
budget emphasis occurs when superiors do not deviate from preset budget targets 
when evaluating their subordinates' performance. A low budget emphasis occurs 
when superiors take into account other factors apart from budget targets when 
assessing their subordinates' performance. 
Hopwood (1972) classified superior evaluation styles into three categories: 
1. Budget Constrained Style (BC) is used when a superior evaluates his/hers 
subordinates strictly according to short term budgetary goals. 
2. Profit Conscious Style (PC) describes an evaluation style that still uses 
accounting data but in a moderated fashion. The accounting data are used in a 
flexible manner and other criteria are also of importance. 
3. Nonaccounting Style (NA) is used when accounting data are unimportant in the 
evaluation of subordinates' performance. 
Several researchers have categorised the Budget Constrained Style and the Profit 
Conscious Style as high budget emphasis and the Nonaccounting Style as low budget 
emphasis ( e.g. Brownell, 1982; Brownell and Hirst, 1986; Brownell & Dunk, 1991 ). 
Hopwood tested these consequences of the three different evaluative styles. He found 
that the budget constrained style (BC) resulted in greater stress, more hostility towards 
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superiors and peers, a greater tendency to blame other managers for poor performance 
outcomes and a tendency to charge departmental costs to other departments, as well as 
a greater tendency to falsify budget data. 
Concept of Budgetary Participation 
Milani (1975, p. 274) defines participation as a concept "used to describe the extent to 
which a subordinate is allowed to select his own courses of action". Brownell (1982) 
similarly defined participation as an organisational process whereby individuals are 
involved in, and have influence on, decisions that have direct effects on those 
individuals (p. 126). It refers to the process in which individuals, on the basis of their 
achievement of budgeted targets, are involved and have influence on the setting of 
those budget targets. 
Brownell (1982) undertook a study in order to bring closure to Hopwood's (1972) and 
Otley's ( 1978) contradictory findings by incorporating budgetary participation as a 
moderating variable. He suggested that there are no direct observable associations 
between superior evaluative style and performance because the relationship is affected 
by budgetary participation. He based his hypotheses on two theoretical paradigms, 
operant conditioning and balance theory. Operant conditioning is concerned with the 
level of participation when planning the budget. Cherrington & Cherrington (1973) 
explained that rewards for budget related performance should be compatible with the 
level of emphasis placed on budgets. The relationship between budget emphasis and 
participation will operate in the same manner, as subordinates will accept high budget 
emphasis only if they have been involved in setting the budget targets. Balance theory 
explains the predicted consequences of either high budget emphasis matched with 
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high budgetary participation or low budget emphasis matched with low budgetary 
participation. 
Brownell ( 1982) found a significant interaction between budgetary participation and 
budget emphasis affecting managerial performance. Similarly, Bottger & Hirst (1988) 
found that budgetary participation reduces job related tension when there is high 
budget emphasis. 
Concept of Trust 
Gibb ( l 96 l) identifies trust as a condition that facilitates interpersonal acceptance and 
------- .. ,. -- -- ... 
openness of expression. Deutsch ( l 962) considers trusting behaviour as consisting of 
"actions that (a) increase one's vulnerability, (b) to another whose behavior is not 
(._ _____ _ 
under one's control, (c) in a situation in which the penalty (disutility) one suffers if the 
other abuses that vulnerability is greater than the benefit (utility) one gains if the other 
does not abuse the vulnerability" Cited in Zand ( l 972, p. 230). 
In this thesis, trust is argued to be an important motivating factor that influences the 
subordinates to work towards a better environment in their job situation. It may affect 
the level of tension the subordinates feel, and the level of slack they create. It may be 
related directly to the degree of subordinate's participation in the budgetary process. 
Ouchi ( l 98 l) suggests that trust is the keyword when explaining the success of 
Japanese management styles because the success stems from a willingness on the part 
of the employees to sacrifice personal interests through the knowledge that such 
sacrifices will always be repaid in the' future due to the managerial practices that foster 
trust (p. 6). 
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Concept of Organisational Commitment 
Mowday et al. ( 1979)-define organisational commitment as ''the relative strength of an 
individual's identification with and involvement in a particular organization." They 
suggested that organisational commitment is characterised by three related factors: 
1) a strong belief in and acceptance of the organisation's goals and 
values; 
2) a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the 
organisation; and 
3) a strong desire to maintain membership in the organisation. (p. 226). 
Another defintion offered by DeCotiis & Summers ( 1987) considers organisational 
commitment as "the extent to which an individual accepts and internalizes the goals 
and values of an organisation and views his or her organizational role in terms of its 
contribution to those goals and values, apart from any personal instrumentalitis that 
may attend his or her contribution" (p. 448). 
The existing literature operates with different conceptualisations of organisational 
commitment. Nevertheless, there seems to be a clear distinction between affective 
commitment and continuance commitment (Meyer et al., 1990). Affective 
commitment encompasses the three characteristics given above, whereas continuance 
commitment is concerned more with the costs associated with leaving the organisation 
(Becker, 1960). To be consistent with prior literature (eg., Nouri & Parker, 1996), this 
thesis employs the affective commitment conceptualisation of organisational 
commitment. 
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Concept of Slack Creation 
Cyert & March (l 963) defined organisational slack as the difference between the total 
resources available to the firm and the total necessary to maintain the organisation 
coalition. Later researchers have defined slack in the context of a budgetary process. 
Slack is regarded as part of the budgetary deviations between actual and standards 
intentionally created by the subordinates (Onsi, 1973; Birnberg et al., 1983; Merchant, 
1985; Young, 1985; Chow et al., 1988; Dunk, 1993). Lau & Eggelton (1998) define 
slack as the "extent of intentional understatement of the subordinate's performance 
capability built into the budget by the subordinate to make budgeted targets easier to 
attain," (p. 5). This thesis employ the latter definition of slack creation. 
Concept of Job Related Tension 
Job related tension may be defined as "tension arising from psychologically stressful 
circumstances in the job environment" (Kenis, 1979, p. 55). Jamal (1985) similarly 
defines job stress as "an individual's reactions to the characteristics of the work 
environment which appear threatening to the individual," (p. 410). These definitions 
are adopted for job related tension in this thesis. 
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Hypotheses Development 
High participatory environment in the Norwegian society 
Just as common culture can exist in a society comprising individuals who vary in 
terms of personality, a common pattern of participation can occur in a certain cultural 
environment. Hence, some researchers argue that some societal cultures may promote 
a high participatory environment, whilst other societal cultures may promote a low 
participatory environment (Hofstede, 1980; Brownell, 1982b). For instance, Harrison 
( 1992) suggests that societies with a low (high) power distance culture are likely to 
have high (low) participation among members of the societies. Lau & Buckland 
( 1999) suggested that participatory environments are also likely to be influenced by 
the political, social and economic norms of socities. 
Power distance occurs because of human inequalities in areas such as prestige, wealth 
and power, the extent of which is determined by the ways societies deal with such 
inequalities. High power distance societies are characterised by the importance and 
formalisation of such human inequalities, whereas low power distance societies 
emphasise dominance and stratification (Hofstede, 1980). As low poser distance 
cultures generally deemphasise the importance of hierarchy in society, but stress the 
importance of equality and the sharing of power among members of the societies, 
participation in the affairs of the societies by all their members is expected to be the 
norm in low power distance cultures. Norway has a low power distance culture. In a 
study undertaken by Hofstede ( 1980), a power distance score of 31 was reported for 
Norway. A more recent study by Lau & Buckland (1999) reported an even lower score 
of minus I 0. This suggests that participation among members of the Norwegian 
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society in the affairs of their groups and their organisations is likely to be high. 
Harrison ( 1992) suggests that individualism can also affect participation. Norway was 
reported to have an individualism score of 69 by both Hofstede ( 1980) and Lau & 
Buckland ( 1999). This moderate level of individualism score is unlikely to affect the 
high extent of participation in the Norwegian society brought about by its very low 
power distance culture, particularly the very low power distance score of minus 10 
reported recently by Lau & Buckland (1999). Hence, it is probable that the Norwegian 
society is characterised by a high extent of participation, including budgetary 
participation, among members of the society. 
The high participatory environment in Norway is also supported by its very centralised 
and formalised industrial relations systems which emphasisie democratic work 
enviroment (Lau & Buckland, 1999). Norway has a very strong trade union 
movement, led by the powerful Landsorganisasjonen. The Landsorganisasjonen is 
very closely affiliated with the Norwegian Labour Party, the political party whcih has 
dominated the government in Norway for the past few decades and has given Norway 
a socialist government almost continuously since the 1930s. The consolidated position 
shared by the Landsorganisasjonen and the Norwegian Labour Party has enable these 
two powerful bodies to introduce many pro-labour policies and legislation which 
enshrine the positions and power of the employees in their organisations. Hence, the 
Norwegian industrial relations systems are very formalised, whereby, much of the 
work environment is enshrined in legislations, such as the very comprehensive Work 
Environment Act passed by the Norwegian parliament in 1977. 
Not only is the Norwegian work environment very formalised, it is also very 
democratic (Lau & Buckland, 1999). In a study of Norwegian and Swedish industrial 
relations systems, Johansen ( 1985, p. 6) noted that "Norway and Sweden have 
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developed a view of thechnology which is different from the orthodox capitalist view 
of profit maximisation towards a democratised technology." (Emphasis added). He 
further reported that since the 1960s, both Norway and Sweden have been involved 
"in the first systematic national effort in the world to change and democratise the 
quality of work life. These developments .... strengthened trade union participation in 
technological change and more humanistic and democratic forms of work .... By the 
1980s, Norway and Sweden have become leaders in developing innovative and 
democratic approaches to the problems of ... work design: ( emphasis added). Hence, 
Norwegian employees participate and involve themselves in all aspects of their 
organisations' affairs up to the highest organisational level. There are legislations 
which provide employees with representation at their organisations' board level. 
Norwegian organisations with more than 200 employees are also required by 
legislation to set ut "Company Assemblies" with a third of their members elected by 
the employees. The "Company Assemblies" are powerful bodies with authority to 
cover most aspects of Norwegian working life (Johansen, 1985). Hence, it is possible 
to conclude that the Norwegian work environment is likely to be characterised by very 
high participatory environment, with employees enjoying a very high extent of 
participation in all the affairs of their organisations, including budgetary participation. 
Finally, as the Norwegian society is very homogeneous, in terms of ethnic 
background, religion, language and egalitarianism, participation is not only high, but 
also widespread among Norwegian managers. Based on the above discussion, the 
following hypothesis is tested: 
Ht The extent of budgetary participation among Norwegian managers is 
high. 
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The effects of budget emphasis in high participatory environment 
Prior studies suggest that matching budget emphasis with budgetary participation is 
crucial before beneficial behavioural outcomes such as lower job related tension could 
occur. Relying on operant conditioning and balance theory, Brownell (19 82a) argued 
that a compatible match of high budget emphasis and high participation is needed to 
achieve improved behavioural outcomes. Since a high budget emphasis evaluative 
style links rewards to the achievement of budget targets, budget targest are therefore 
important to the subordinates. Participation is therefore important to the subordinates, 
possibly because participation improves subordinates' understanding of the budget 
target setting process and allows them to incfluence the levels of their budget targets. 
Brownell (1982a) found support for his expectation pertaining to managerial 
performance. Similar results pertaining to the beneficial consequences of a compatible 
match of budget emphasis and participation were found by a number of subsequent 
studies although in varying circumstances. These include Brownell & Hirst ( 1986), 
Brownell & Dunk (1991, Harrision (1992), Dunk (1993), Lau et al. (1995), Lau & Tan 
( 1998), Lau & Eggleton ( 1998) and Lau & Buckland ( 1999). Such remarkable 
similarities in the results provide support for the expectation that a high budget 
emphasis evaluative style is likely to be associated with favourable behavioral 
outcomes, such as reduced job related tension and reduced propensity to create slack, 
and in a high participatory environment. Since it was previously hypothesised that the 
Norwegian culture promotes a high participatory environment, a high budget emphasis 
evaluative style in the high Norwegian participatory environment is likely to be 
associated with low job related tension and a low propensity to create slack. 
The following hypotheses are therefore tested: 
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H2. l Budget emphasis is negatively associated with job related tension in the 
Norwegian high participatory environment. 
H2.2 Budget emphasis is negatively associated with subordinates' propensity to 
create slack in the Norwegian high participatory environment. 
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Relationships between variables in Model One {Figure 3.1) 
Model One 
The following sections provide the theoretical justification for the relationships 
between the variables examined in Model One (see Figure 3.1). 
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(a) Budget emphasis and job related tension/propensity to create slack 
Whilst prior studies have found remarkabley consistent results pertaining to the 
beneficial behavioural consequences associated with a compatible combination of 
high budget emphasis and high participation, there has been little systematic 
investigation in the manner in which this combination is able to produce the desired 
behavioural outcomes. This gap in the literature provide the motivation for this study 
to systematically examine the intervening effects of omitted variables to explain why a 
compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high participation could lead to 
lower job related tension and propensity to create slack in a high participatory 
environment. 
Support for the existence of omitted variables is found in the results of two of the 
earliest studies in this research area. Whilst Hopwood (1972) found a significant 
relationship between performance evaluative styles and job related tension, Otley 
(1978) was unable to find any significant results. Otley' s failure to find a significant 
relationship between evaluative styles and job related tension strongly suggests that 
evaluative style by itself may have no direct effect on subordinates' attitudes. Since a 
significant finding was found in Hopwood's study, this significant finding is likely to 
be an indirect effect through some omitted intervening variables. Moreover, since the 
results ranges from significant (Hopwood's finding) to not significant (Otley's 
finding), they suggest that the omitted vaiables have a full mediation (Baron & Kenny, 
1986) on the relationship between evaluative styles and job related tension/propensity 
to create slack. This thesis therefore proposes that there is no direct relationships 
between budget emphasis and job related tension/propensity to create slack. Instead, 
the relationships ae indirect via trust and participation. The theoretical support for this 
expectation is provided below in sections (b), (c) and (d). 
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(b) Budget emphasis and trust 
The link between trust and budget emphasis was first explored by Ross (1994) who 
found that budget emphasis interacted with trust to affect job related tension. He found 
trust to be significant in moderating the effects of budget emphasis on job related 
tension only with respect to the two evaluative styles (budget conscious and profit 
constrained) which rely on accounting performance measures, but not with respect to 
nonaccounting style. 
This thesis proposes a positive relationship between budget emphasis and trust in the 
Norwegian high participatory environment. According to Ross ( 1994 ), subordinates 
are likely to be suspicious and apprehensive of a nonaccounting evaluative style. He 
described such a style as difficult to interpret as "the criteria associated with the 
nonaccounting performance evaluation style are somewhat subjective and therefore, 
may well be ambiguous and difficult to measure" and are subject to "a superior's 
biases and idiosyncrasies" (p. 630). He further suggested that subordinates "may 
always have a nagging doubts as to the reasonableness of an evaluation based on 
subjective criteria .... The managers may, therefore, feel a lack of control over their 
ability to affect their evaluation". In contrast, evaluative style based on accounting 
performance measures are likely to be much more acceptable to subordinates because 
such criteria were described by Ross ( 1994) as much more "objective" and 
"verifiable" than nonaccounting criteria. This means that nonaccounting evaluative 
styles are likely to be associated with greater mistrust than accounting based 
evaluative styles. 
Empirically, Hopwood (1972, p. 173) found that trust was positively associated with 
the two criteria of "meeting the budget" and "concern with costs", the two items he 
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used to measure accounting based criteria. He suggested that ''this migh reflect the fact 
that one purpose of a budget is to clearly set out the objectives for a cost centre. While 
this certainly cannot be done with perfect accuracy, it is possible to carefully and 
cautiously use the budget for this purpose and thereby add an important element of 
structure and clarity to the job environment." He further suggested that "A 
nonaccounting evaluation, in particular, might be made on the basis of rather vague 
criteria: attitudes, the way the cost centre head handles his men, and effort. Whilst 
such criteria are important, they are surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty. It is 
difficulty to clearly specify what constitutes good and bad performance, and a 
supervisor might find it difficulty to determine when improvement occurs. In these 
circumstances, the budgetary systems offer one definite advantage. It attempts to 
express the unit's objectives in a precise manner." (p. 174). Within the Norwegian 
cultural environment, where high participation is common and widespread, a high 
budget emphasis evaluative style in Norway is similar to a high budget emphasis and 
high participation combination. As this is regareded as a desirable combination 
(Brownell, 1982a), it is likely to be received favourably by Norwegain managers. 
Hence, it is possible to conclude that in a high participatory environment such as 
Norway, a high budget emphasis evaluative style is likely to be positively associated 
with trust. 
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(c) Trust and job related tension/propensity to create slack 
Trust is likely to be an important variable affecting job related tension and propensity 
to create slack. Zand (l 972, p. 230) defines trust as "actions that (a) increase one's 
vulnerability, (b) to another whose behaviour is not under one's control, (c) in a 
situation in which the penalty (disutility) one suffers if the other abuses that 
vulnerability is greater than the benefit (utility) one gains if the other does not abuse 
the vulnerability." Accordingly, a low trust environment is not conducive to open 
communication. Subordinates learn to bottle up their feelings and not to express them 
openly. Such a strained working environment is likely to lead to high job related 
tension. In contrast, when high trust exists, subordinates and their superiors are more 
willing to communicate with each other. They are also likely to be more willing to 
express their feelings and air their concerns and grievances more openly. 
Trust is generally associated with the acceptance of each other decisions. Trust is 
crucial for the subordinates to accept their superiors' decision and choices, such as the 
choice of evaluative styles. Trust will alleviate the consequences of choices. With 
trust, superior choices are accepted and agreed, leading to low job related tension. In 
contrast under low trust condition, suspicion is likely to lead to lack of agreement and 
apprehensive of the superios'decisions and choices. This is likely to lead to high job 
related tension. For instance, Ross suggested that "the level of job related tension that 
resulted from performance evaluation can be reduced by the development of trust held 
by subordinates for their superiors." (p. 630). 
In summary, trust is a prerequisite for a number of activities, such as communication, 
problem solving and decision making. In a high trust environment, all these activities 
can be undertaken with less apprehension and conflict as trust generally facilitates 
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such activities. With less conflict between subordinates and the superiors, 
subordinates' job related tension is likely to be reduced. Trust leads to greater 
acceptance of other views, greater consensus of opinions of the two parties and hence 
less disagreement and conflict (Merlinger, 1965). It is therefore possible to conclude 
that trust is negaitvely associated with job related tension. Similarly, in a high trust 
environment, subordinates are less likely to create budgetary slack. As Zand (1972) 
suggests, 
"one who does not trust others will conceal or distort relevant information, 
and avoid stating or will disguise facts, conclusions and feelings that he 
believes will increase his exposure to others, so that the information he 
provides will be low in accuracy, comprehensiveness, and timeliness; and 
therefore have low congruence with reality" (p. 230). 
Hence, it is also possible to conclude that trust is negatively associated with 
subordinates' propensity to create slack. 
The discussion in section (a) suggests that budget emphasis is negatively related to job 
related tension/propensity to create slack in a high participatory environment. 
However, section (b) indicates that budget emphasis may also be positively related to 
trust. Trust, in turn, may be negatively related to job related tension/propensity to 
create slack (see Section (c)). These discussions therefore support the existence of an 
indirect effect of budget emphasis on job related tension/propensity to create slack 
through trust. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H3. l Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through trust. 
H3.2 Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through 
trust. 
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(d) Budget emphasis and participation 
In addition to trust, it is plausable that budgetary participation may also be an 
intervening variable in the relationship between budget emphasis and job related 
tension. Prior studies suggest that high participation is needed to complement a high 
budget emphasis evaluative style (Brownell, 1982a, Brownell & Hirst, 1986). A high 
budget emphasis evaluative style places a heavy reliance on accounting performance 
measures such as budget targets (Hirst, 1981, 1983) as criteria for the evaluation of 
subordinates' performance. As performance evaluation is likely to be closely linked to 
the reward systems, performance evaluation criteria are likely to be of interest and 
concern to the subordinates since these criteria are likely to affect their rewards in 
terms of remuneration, bonuses and promotions. Consequently, they are likely to want 
to participate in the budget setting process so that they can understand how their 
budget targets are determined and also to influence the levels of these budget targets. 
Studies have also found that budgetary participation was associated with better 
performance as budgetary participation led to greater subordiantes' acceptance of 
budget targets, which in turn, led to greater subordinates' internalisation of budget 
targets (Becker & Green, 1962). Since high participation is important to the 
subordinates in a high budget emphasis situation, it is highly likely that organisations 
using a high budget emphasis evaluative style will experience a greater willingness to 
a participative budgeting setting process. In contrast, if a low budget emphasis 
evaluative style is used, there would be less incentive for the subordinates to be overly 
concerned with the budget setting process. Consequently, budgetary participation is 
likely to be lower in a low budget emphasis situation than in a high budget emphasis 
situation. This expectation was supported by the results of Lau & Buckland (1999), 
who found a highly significant positive relationship between budget emphasis and 
participation among Norwegian managers. The above discussion therefore suggests 
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that a positive relationship exists between budget emphasis and budgetary 
participation. 
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(e) Budgetary participation and job related tension/propensity to create slack 
Budgetary participation serves as a means of communication between the subordinates 
and their superiors. It allows the subordinates to exchange and seek information from 
their superiors, leading to a greater understanding of the budget setting process and 
other organisational affairs. It also permits the subordinates to air their grievances, to 
seek information for task completion (Brownell & Hirst, 1986), to ensure budget 
adequacy (Nouri & Parker, 1998), by incorporating their input on the amount of 
resources needed to sucessfully perform their tasks. Participation also permits the 
subordinate to influence their budget targets. All these benefits of participation are 
likely to lead to a greater extent of agreement on the evaluative style used, less 
suspicion and apprehension and therefore less stress and anxiety. Consequently, it is 
plausible that high participation will lead to lower job related tension/propensity to 
create slack. 
In summary, based on the discussion above, it is plausable that budget emphasis is 
positively related to budgetary participation (see Section (d)). Budgetary participation, 
in tum, is likely to be negatively related to job related tension/propensity to create 
slack (see Section (e)). These relationships suggest that the effect of budget emphasis 
on job related tension/propensity to create slack as discussed in Section (a) may be 
indirect through participation. The following hypotheses are therefore tested: 
H4. I Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through 
budgetary participation. 
H4.2 Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through 
budgetary participation. 
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( f) Budgetary participation and trust 
Budgetary participation is likely to promote a higher extent of trust between the 
subordinates and their superiors in a number of ways. First, budgetary participation 
opens up the budget target setting process to ghe subordinates' scrutiny. It makes the 
process transparent, thereby lowering subordinates' fear, apprehension, suspicion and 
mistrust of their superior's evaluative styles and ultimately their superiors. Related to 
these, participation permits the subordinates to understand how their budget targets are 
ascertained. Third, budgetary participation allows the subordinates to influence the 
level of their budget targets, leading to more accurate and realistic targets. 
Subordinates are more likely to trust the budget targets they are involved in setting 
than targets that are imposed on them by others. Fourth, budgetary participation 
provides the opportunity for the subordinates to communicate with their superiors, not 
only on budget-related matters, but also on other issues of concern to them. Finally, as 
the Norwegian society is generally highly receptive to high participation, high 
budgetary participation would be consistent with the societal norm. In conclusion, it is 
plausible that budgetary participation, which promotes an atmosphere of greater 
transperency, open and frank communication and is consistent with the cultural norm, 
is likely to be associated with a greater feeling of trust between Norwegian managers 
and their superiors. This suggests a positive association between budgetary 
participation and trust. 
Note that it was previously discussed in Section (e) that budgetary participation is 
likely to be negatively related to job related tension. Since Section (f) indicates that 
budgetary participation is also likely to be positively related to trust, and trust, in tum, 
may be negatively related to job related tension/propensity to create slack (see Section 
( c )), it is possible to conclude that the effect of budgetary participation on job related 
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tension/propensity to create slack may be mediated by the intervening effect of trust. 
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H5. l Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on job related tension through 
trust. 
H5.2 Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack 
through trust. 
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Relationships between variables in Model Two {Figure 3.2) 
Model Two 
The following sections provide the theoretical justification for the relationships 
between the variables examined in Model Two (see Figure 3 .2). 
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The relationship between budget emphasis and budgetary participation 
The expected hypothesisd relationship between budget emphsis and budgetary 
participation discussed for the previous model, model one (see Section d), will apply 
to model two. 
(g) The relationship between budgetary participation and organisational 
commitment 
This thesis proposes a positive relationship between budgetary participation and 
organisational commitment for a number of reasons. First, budgetary participation 
enables the subordinates to understand the budget setting process. It also enables the 
subordinates to directly affect the budgets and/or budget setting process to their 
organisation's benefit. It is plausable that a better understanding and higher 
appreciation of the organisational goals will lead to a higher level of commitment by 
the subordinates towards their organisations. 
Additionally, as budgetary participation enables the subordinates to influence 
decisions directly affecting them, it enhances their feeling of importance, of being 
valued and appreciated by their organisations. Participation also improves the 
relationship between the subordinates and the superior, as both parties have to make 
an effort to communicate, and thereby understand each other. To sum up, participation 
may generate more satisfied employees who may then feel more committed to their 
organisations. 
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The importance of participation in enhancing individuals' commitment to their 
organisations is also argued by Hanson (1966) who suggests that subordinates' 
participation in the budget setting process will give the subordinates a better 
identification with both budget objectives and organisational goals than subordinates 
who do not participate. Similarly, Ouchi (1981) points out that for those organisations 
with employees experiencing high commitment, the decision-making process is 
largely a participatory one. Other prior studies also support a relationship between 
organisational commitment and participation. For instance, Angle & Perry (1981) 
suggest that employees' contributions to the organisation can be in two general forms, 
with participation as one of them. Another example of the importance of participation 
in decision-making was found by Rhodes & Steers ( 1981 ), who hypothesised that 
perceived participation in decision-making is greater for worker-owners in 
cooperatives than for employees in conventional firms, as worker-owners are likely to 
be more committed to their organisations than employees in conventional firms. This 
suggests a relationship between participation and organisational commitment. 
Welsch & La Van (1981) and DeCotiis & Summers (1987) also report a positive link 
between employee participation and organisational commitment. Welsch & LaVan 
found that participation in the decision-making process and clear downward 
communications were directly linked to cohesiveness, referred to the sense of 
teamwork, which in tum affects organisational commitment "through the individual's 
understanding of the organizations' goals and values and through his or her role 
involvement." (p. 464 ). 
Finally, a recent paper by Nouri & Parker (1998), where they tested both direct and 
indirect links between budget participation, organisational commitment and job 
performance provides further support for a significant relationship between budget 
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participation and organisational commitment. Based on the above discussion, it is 
p/ausable that there is a positive direct relationship between budgetary participation 
and organisational commitment (see model two in Fig. 3.2). 
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(h) The relationship between organisational commitment and job related 
tension/propensity to create slack 
This thesis suggests that organisational commitment is likely to have an impact on 
subordinates job related tension and propensity to create slack. Subordinates who feel 
committed to their organisation are likely to identify themselves with the 
organisation's goals and values, and may thus better appreciate and work towards 
these goals at his/hers best effort. Since job related tension and propensity to create 
slack are mainly associated with dysfunctional side effects, it is probable that strongly 
committed subordinates are likely to have lower job related tension and propensity to 
create slack. 
This proposition is supported by Nouri (1994) who examined the relationship between 
organisational commitment and job involvement and their effects on managers' 
propensity to create slack. He argued that "managers who are highly committed to 
organizational goals and values should have low levels of propensity to create 
budgetary slack because they understand the dysfunctional impacts of budgetary slack 
on the organisation" (p. 291). It is therefore proposed in this thesis that organisational 
commitment and job related tension/propensity to create slack are negatively related. 
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(i) The relationship between budget emphasis and organisational commitment 
A positive relationship between budget emphasis and organisational commitment is 
hypothesised in this thesis for a number of reasons. First, budget emphasis is 
accounting based. As discussed previously, Hopwood ( 1972) identified three different 
performance evaluative styles, budget constrained (BC), profit conscious (PC) and non 
accounting (NA). The budget constrained and profit conscious styles are characterised 
by a high reliance on accounting performance criteria. The non accounting 
management styles allow for a more flexible use of a wider range of performance 
criteria for longer-term objectives (Briers & Hirst, 1990). As an accounting based 
evaluation criteria involves clarity and objectivity it is plausable that the subordinates 
may be more satisfied with a performance evaluation style that contains no ambiguity. 
In other words, they would appreciate a high budget emphasis evaluative style. When 
the subordinates feel they are being evaluated with a clear and fair system they are 
likely to be more committed to the organisation. 
There is some support from prior literature that superiors' evaluative style is related to 
organisational commitment. For instance, Hanson (1966) suggests that "the more 
closely an individual identifies himself with budget goals, the more appropriate will be 
his responses to the budget." (p. 241 ). As budgets reflect organisational goals, 
identification with budget goals is also likely to increase the subordinates' 
identification with organisational goals. Similarly, Collins et al. (1995) found in their 
study of not-for-profit organisations that superiors' evaluative style was directly 
related to organisational commitment. 
Finally, budget emphasis is normally accompanied wth budgetary participation. By 
allowing participation in the budgetary setting procedures the subordinates will be 
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motivated to work harder to meet those goals. Also, the subordinates may feel that 
their words and effort are being recognised and appreciated. It is therefore p/ausable 
that budget emphasis will enhance subordinates' organisational commitment. 
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Indirect effed on budget emphasis on job related tension/propensity to create slack 
through organisational commitment 
Based on the discussion in Section (a) (Budget emphasis and job related 
tension/propensity to create slack), Section (i) (Budget emphasis and organisational 
commitment) and Section (h) (Organisational commitment and job related 
tension/propensity to create slack) the following hypotheses are tested: 
H6. l Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through 
organisational commitment. 
H6.2 Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through 
organisational commitment. 
Indirect effect of budget emphasis on job related tension/propensity to create slack 
through budgetary participation 
Based on the discussion in Section (a) (Budget emphasis and job related 
tension/propensity to create slack), Section (d) (Budget emphasis and budgetary 
participation), Section (g) (Budgetary participation and organisational commitment) 
and Section (h) (Organisational commitment and job related tension/propensity to 
create slack), the following hypotheses are tested: 
H7. l Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through 
budgetary participation. 
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H7 .2 Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through 
budgetary participation. 
Indirect effect of budgetary participation on job related tension/propensity to create 
slack through organisational commitment 
Based on the discussion in Section (e) (Budgetary participation and job related 
tension/propensity to create slack), Section (g) (Budgetary participation and 
organisational commitment) and Section (h) (Organisational commitment and job 
related tension/propensity to create slack) it is plausable to conclude that budgetary 
participation has an indirect effect on job related tension/propensity to create slack 
through organisational commitment. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are tested: 
HS. I Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on job related tension through 
organisational commitment. 
H8.2 Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack 
through organisational commitment. 
Conclusion 
A total of eight sets of hypotheses are developed in this chapter. The results of the 
hypothesis tests will be reported in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER4 
Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the methods used in this thesis. A description of the data 
collection is provided followed by the justification for the selection of the nation, 
organisations and respondents. Lastly, a description and justification for the 
measurement instruments used to measure the variables in this thesis are presented. 
Data collection 
Data were collected by the use of a questionnaire, which was sent to 300 functional 
heads from 150 manufacturing companies selected randomly from the manufacturing 
industry in Norway. Since the measurement instruments adopted for this thesis are 
written in English, and since English is not a widely spoken language in Norway, the 
measurement instruments were translated into Norwegian. 
The selection of a nation 
The survey was based on the Norwegian manufacturing industry. Culturally Norway 
fits into the same category as nations belonging to the Anglo-American block, for 
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instance, Australia, U.K, and the U.S.A. with regard to the power distance and 
individualism dimensions (Hofstede, 1984). It is clustered with the other two 
-
Scandinavian countries, Denmark and Sweden, enabling the results of this thesis to be 
generalisable to Scandinavia as a whole. 
Selection of organisations 
The selected organisations are manufacturing companies in Norway, as the use of 
budgets is fairly common in such companies. These organisations (a total of 100) were 
randomly selected from Kompass Norway (1998). Only organisations with a 
minimum of one hundred employees were selected to ensure that only relatively large 
organisations were selected. Large organisations were used as large organisations are 
more likely to rely on formal rather than informal budgetary control systems. 
Selection of respondents 
Respondents were selected from the company's work functional units to ensure that 
the respondents were responsible for an identifiable department of the organisation for 
which budgets are set, whether in profit terms, sales volume, revenue or cost terms 
(Harrison, 1992, p. l 10-111 ). Functional heads from three different functional areas 
were selected to represent three different work units. The functional heads were 
mostly department managers from . the functional areas of marketing, finance, 
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personnel departments, and production. The names of the functional heads were 
obtained from Kompass Norway 1998. 
The administration of the questionnaires was carried out in June 1998. The selected 
respondents were sent a questionnaire together with a covering letter explaining the 
objectives of the research, and a prepaid addressed envelope. A follow up by 
telephone to those respondents who had not replied was undertaken three weeks after 
the date the questionnaires were mailed. Appendix A presents the covering letter to the 
respondents. 
Translation of questionnaire 
Both the Norwegian and the English versions of the instruments used in this thesis are 
presented in Appendix B. The process of translating the questionnaire from English to 
Norwegian involved three seperate steps. First, the author of this thesis (who is a 
Norwegian) translated the questionnaire from English to Norwegian. Second, a 
Norwegian professor of management at an Australian university translated the 
Norwegian version of the questionnaire back to English. The last step involved a 
cross-check of the latter English version with the orginal English version of the 
quesionnaire to ensure that the translation was accurately undertaken. 
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Measurement instruments 
-
The following describes and justifies the choice of instruments used for measuring the 
independent variables of budget emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational 
commitment and trust, and the dependent variables of propensity to create slack and 
job related tension. 
Budget emphasis 
Budget emphasis was measured by Hopwood's ( 1972) instrument. His original 
instruments contained the following items: 
1. Co-operation with colleagues 
2. Concern with costs 
3. How well the subordinate gets along with the superior 
4. Concern with quality 
5. Meeting the budget 
6. Attitude towards work and company 
7. Ability to handle employees 
Later researchers made some modifications to Hopwood's instrument. Brownell and 
Hirst (1986) added three new items to the list, by dividing "attitude towards work and 
company" into two items, and adding a new item "how well I cooperate with 
individuals outside the firm". This modified version was used in this thesis. 
Based on Brownell's ( l 982) comment that many of his respondents failed to complete 
the questionnaire adequately when they were asked to rank the items, the rating form 
instead of the ranking form was used in this study. The rating allows the evaluative 
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styles to be measured as a continuum (Otley, 1978; Govindarajan, 1984; Brownell and 
Dunk, 1991; Harrison, 1992). 
The two accounting based items: "Concern with costs" and "Meeting the budget" were 
used to measure budget emphasis. The item "Meeting the budget" was intended to be 
linked to situations when a cost center head's performance is evaluated based on the 
cost center head's ability to "continually meet the budget on a short term basis" 
(Hopwood, 1972, p. 160) (emphasis added). The item "concern with costs" was 
intended to measure the "unit's operations in relation to the long-term purpose of the 
organization" (Hopwood, 1972, p. 160) (emphasis added). Harrison (1992, 1993) 
modified Hopwood's item "Meeting the budget" to "My ability to meet budgeted 
targets in the short run", and the item "Concern with costs" to "My long run concern 
with cost and/or revenues." These were also adopted in this study. 
A high combined score of these two items indicates high budget emphasis and a low 
combined score indicates a low budget emphasis. The 10-item list is numbered A 1 to 
A 10 in the questionnaire in Appendix B. 
Budgetary participation 
Budgetary participation was measured by Milani's (1975) instrument and are 
numbered DI to D6 in Appendix B. A 7-point Likert scale was used. The scale is 
additive as the participation score is obtained by adding the scores of all six items. The 
scale has been tested and used extensively in a number of previous studies (eg. 
Brownell, 1982, 1985; Brownell and Hirst, 1986; Brownell and Dunk, 1991; Harrison, 
1992; Lau et al., 1995, 1997; Lau & Tan, 1998). Their results of the internal 
consistency of the instrument have shown satisfactory Cronbach alpha values. 
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Trust 
Trust was measured by a four-item instrument developed by Zand (1972). As Zand 
conducted his research based on interviews and case settings, the questions regarding 
the evaluation of trust between a subordinate and a superior were set out in a 
questionnaire form with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to 
"strongly agree". The questions include "You have learned from your experiences 
during the past two years that you can trust the other members of top management", 
and "You and the other top managers openly express your differences and your 
feelings of encouragement or of disappointment." The questions are numbered C 1 to 
C4 in Appendix B. 
Organisational Commitment 
The instrument developed by Mowday et al. (1979) to measure organisational 
commitment was used. It is a nine-item short-form scale assessed on a seven-point 
Likert scale. It includes items like, "I found that my values and the organisation's 
values are very similar" and "I really care about the fate of this organisation." Prior 
studies have reported satisfactory levels of reliability and validity for this scale (Price 
& Muller, 1981; Blau, 1987; Nouri & Parker, 1996, 1998). 
Propensity to create slack 
There are two instruments to measure slack, namely, Dunk's (1993) four-item 
instrument and Onsi's (1973) four-item instrument. The latter measures the 
subordinate's propensity to create slack, which focuses more on the subordinate's 
attitude towards slack creation. 
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The measurement instrument developed by Onsi (1973) was adopted in this thesis for 
a number of reasons. First, it has been widely used in prior studies with satisfactory 
-
levels of internal reliability ( e.g., Merchant, 1985, Nouri, 1994; Nouri & Parker, 
1996; Lal et al., 1996, Lau & Eggleton, 1998). Second, the instrument also implicitly 
measures subordinates' intention to create slack, which is more consistent with the 
definition of slack adopted in this thesis. Moreover, the instrument developed by Dunk 
(1993) does not distinguish between slack created by superiors and slack created by 
the subordinates, nor does it measure the subordinate's intentions to create slack (Lau 
& Eggleton, 1998). The questions pertaining to propensity to create slack are 
numbered Hl-H4 in Appendix B. 
Job Related Tension 
Job-related tension is defined as tension arising from psychologically stressful 
circumstances in the job environment. There is an instrument known as Job Related 
Tension index developed by the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan to measure this variable. This index comprises 15 questions with a 7-point 
scale. Since tension is stress-related in the work environment, the questions are related 
to the individual's feelings towards his/hers working environment. For instance, 
respondents are asked if they feel that they have enough authority, responsibilities, 
opportunities, openness towards colleagues, independence etc. The 7-point Likert 
scale ranges from "Very seldom" to "Almost all the time" to express how often the 
individual is bothered by work situations in the daily work routine. 
A number of prior researchers have also used this job-related tension index, including 
Hopwood (1972), Otley ( 1978), Bo~ger & Hirst ( 1988), Hirst ( 1983), Brownell & 
Hirst ( 1986), Harrison ( 1992). The questions are numbered K 1-K 15 in Appendix B. 
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Conclusion 
The instruments for measuring the variables used in this thesis are included in 
Appendix B. The instruments for all variables except for trust have been used 
extensively in managerial accounting research. The next chapter will present the 
results of the reliability and validity tests for these instruments. 
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CHAPTERS 
Results 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of this study. First, it presents the response rate of the 
questionnaire survey and the demographic data of the respondents. Then the 
descriptive statistics of the variables measured and an assessment of the internal 
reliability of the instruments used. This is followed by the results of the factor analysis 
for construct validity, tests for adequacy of the regression models used and a 
correlation matrix for the independent and dependent variables. Lastly, the results of 
the hypothesis tests are presented. 
Response Rate 
Three hundred questionnaires were mailed to respondents from 100 manufacturing 
companies located in Norway. A total of 132 questionnaires were returned, yielding a 
response rate of 44 %. Out of the 132 returned questionnaires, 12 responses were 
excluded from the study as they failed to complete the questionnaire fully. This leaves 
the study with 120 usable responses. The nonresponse test suggested by Oppenheim 
( 1966) indicate that there were no significant differences between early and late 
responses. Hence, nonresponse bias was not present. 
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Demographic Data 
-
The mean age of the respondents was 52.3. On average, the respondents had held their 
current positions for 5 .4 years. The number of years of experience in their present area 
of responsibility averaged to 12.1 years. The mean number of employees in their areas 
of responsibility was 185, and the mean number of employees in their companies was 
1,205. In addition, the demographic data also indicate that the respondents were 
generally highly educated, as 95% of the respondents had tertiary qualifications. 
Factor Analysis for Construct Validity 
To test the variables for construct validity, the factor analysis principle components 
method was used. The method addresses the problem of analysing the structure of the 
inter-relationship among a large number of variables by defining a set of common 
underlying dimension (Hair, et al., 1995). The variables tested for construct validity 
were budgetary participation, organisational commitment, trust, propensity to create 
slack and job related tension. The following Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 present 
the results of the factor analyses, which show the rotated factor matrix, the Eigenvalue 
of each factor and the percentage of total variance explained. 
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Table 5.l 
Factor Anall'.sis of Buda=;etac: Partici(!ation 
Items 
What is the extent of your involvement in the setting of your 
area ofresponsibility's budget? 
2 What is the extent of the reasoning given by your superior for 
revision to your budget? 
3 How frequently do you give your opinions to your superior 
about the budget? 
4 What is the extent of your influence on the final budget for 
your area of responsibility? 
5 What is the degree of importance of your contribution to the 
budget? 
6 How frequently are you asked for your opinions when the 
budget is being set by your superior? 
% of variance explained 
Eigenvalue 
Factor Factor 
1 2 
0.729 -0.362 
0.584 0.610 
0.616 0.356 
0.727 -0.419 
0.814 -0.344 
0.733 0.373 
49.69% 17.70% 
2.981 1.062 
As all the six items show satisfactory loadings, including item (2) (0.584) which also 
loaded on second factor, in the first factor, the scores of all the six items were summed 
and used as the overall score for budgetary participation. 
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Table 5.2 
Factor Amtlysis of Omanisatiomtl Commitment 
Items 
I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that 
normally expected in order to help this organisation 
be successful. 
2 I talk up this organisation to my friends as a great 
organisation to work for. 
3 I would accept almost any type of job assignment 
in order to keep working for this organisation. 
4 I find that my values and this organisation's 
values are very similar. 
5 I am proud to tell others that I am part of this 
organisation. 
6 I really care about the fate of this organisation. 
7 For me, this is the best of all possible 
organisations for which to work. 
8 This organisation really inspires the very best 
in me in the way of job performance. 
9 I am extremely glad that I chose this 
organisation to work for over others I was 
considering at the time I joined. 
% of variance explained 
Eigenvalue 
Factor Factor 
1 2 
0.546 -0.356 
0.770 -0.174 
0.187 0.823 
0.735 0.286 
0.753 -0.180 
0.538 -0.439 
0.724 0.339 
0.802 0.048 
0.795 0.065 
45.79% 14.03% 
4.12 1.26 
One item (number 3) loads on a second factor. Hence, for this thesis, only the scores 
of the eight items (excluding item 3) were summed and used as the overall score for 
organisational commitment. 1 
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Table 5.3 
Factor Analysis of Trust 
Items 
You have learned from your experience during the past two 
years that you can trust the other members of top management. 
2 You and the other top managers openly express your differences 
and your feelings of encouragement or of disappointment. 
3 You and the others share all relevant information and freely 
explore ideas and feelings that may be in or out of your defined 
responsibility. 
4 The result has been a high level of give and take and mutual 
confidence in each other's support and ability. 
% of variance explained 
Eigenvalue 
Factor 
loadings 
0.840 
0.862 
0.849 
0.735 
67.8% 
2.71 
With respect to trust, all four items loaded satisfactory on a single factor. Hence all 
four items were included in the measurement of trust. 
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Table 5.4 
Fa~tor Analysis of The Propensity to create Slack 
Items 
In good business times, my superior is willing to 
accept a reasonable level of slack in my budget. 
2 Slack in the budget is good to do things that 
cannot be officially approved. 
3 To protect himself/herself, a responsibility centre 
manager submits budgets that can safely be attained. 
4 To be safe, a responsibility centre manager sets two 
levels of budgets: one between himself/herself and 
his/her subordinates, and another between 
himself/herself and his/her superior .. 
% of variance explained 
Eigenvalue 
Factor Factor 
1 2 
0.584 -0.547 
0.647 -0.418 
0.666 0.376 
0.647 -0.418 
36.71% 26.29% 
1.47 1.05 
All the items of the variable propensity to create slack have a satisfactory factor 
loading in factor 1. Even though the reliability value (Cronbach alpha) is not 
satisfactory (see Table 5.6), this instrument is used for a number of reasons. First, this 
instrument developed by Onsi (1973), is a relatively well established instrument used 
by almost all survey studies on slack (e.g. Merchant, 1985; Govindarajan, 1986; 
Nouri, 1994; Nouri & Parker, 1994; Lal, Dunk & Smith, 1996; Lau & Eggleton, 
1998). Second, all prior studies, except Posadas & Mia (1995), which used this 
instrument had reported satisfactory reliability and validity. Third, the Cronbach alpha 
of this study is not improved with the deletion of any item from this variable. Finally, 
as stated by Hair, Anderson, Tathan & Black (1995, p. 388) "the comparison of two or 
more factor model results has always been problematic". Many causes, such as the 
sample size and choice of factor analysis techniques, could influence the results. 
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Hence, the reliability of factor analysis results from any single analysis is always 
questionable and not always dependable (Hair, Anderson, Tathan & Black, 1995, p. 
- . 
405). Nevertheless, given the low Cronbach alpha, care should be exercised in 
interpreting the results relating to this variable. 
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Table 5.5 
Factor Analysis of Job related tension 
Factor 
Items l 2 3 4 
Feeling that you have too little authority to carry 
out the responsibilities assigned to you. 0.684 0.224 -0.327 0.276 
2 Being unclear on just what the scope and 
responsibilities of your job are. 0.619 0.184 -0.435 0.279 
3 Not knowing what opportunities for advancement of 
promotion exist for you. 0.642 0.225 0.033 -0.510 
4 Feeling that you have too heavy a work load, one that 
you can't possibly finish during an ordinary work day. 0.678 -0.507 0.007 -0.084 
5 Thinking that you'll not be able to satisfy the conflicting 
demands of various people over you. 0.740 -0.349 -0.075 0.028 
6 Feeling that you are not fully qualified to handle your 
job. 0.501 0.198 0.508 0.196 
7 Not knowing what your superior thinks of you, how he 
or she evaluates your performance. 0.669 0.300 -0.123 -0.159 
8 The fact that you can't get information needed to carry 
out your job. 0.658 0.225 -0.062 0.166 
9 Having to decide things that affect the lives of individuals, 
people that you know. 0.340 -0.150 0.627 0.455 
IO Feeling that you may not be liked and accepted by the 
people you work with. 0.512 0.443 0.403 -0.296 
11 Feeling unable to influence your immediate superior's 
decisions and actions that affect you. 0.717 0.248 -0.159 0.073 
12 Not knowing just what the people you work with expect 
of you. 0.701 0.153 0.149 -0.131 
13 Thinking that the amount of work you have to do may 
interfere with how well it gets done. 0.768 -0.358 -O.i'03 0.106 
14 Feeling that you have to do things on the job that are 
against your better judgement. 0.680 -0.304 0.073 0.089 
15 Feeling that your job tends to interfere with your 
family life. 0.483 -0.490 0.018 -0.420 
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% of variance explained 
Eigenvalue 
40.47 9.716 7.995 6.837 
6.072 l .457 l .199 l .026 
The factor analysis results on job related tension indicate four factors are extracted. 
However, all items, with the excemption of item (9) loaded satisfactorily on Factor 1. 
Hence, the scores of the fourteen items (excluding item 9) were summed and used as 
the overall score for organisational commitment. Item number 15 was included in the 
summation as the factor loadings of (0.483) is very close to 0.5. 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Scale Reliability Measures 
Table 5.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent 
variables measured in this thesis. The table also includes an assessment of the internal 
consistency of the measurements of the applicable variables. 
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Table 5.6 
Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach Alphas for both Independent and Dependent 
Variables 
Budget Emphasis 
Budgetary 
Participation 
Organisational 
Commitment 
Trust 
Slack 
Job Related Tension 
Standard 
Mean Deviation 
11.367 1.878 
36.420 4.630 
45.612 5.920 
21.858 4.193 
11.892 3.622 
34.117 10.901 
Theoretical 
Range 
Min Max 
2 14 
6 42 
8 56 
4 28 
4 28 
14 98 
Actual 
Range 
Min Max 
5 14 
14 42 
26 56 
4 28 
4 21 
14 74 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
n/a 
0.79 
0.86 
0.84 
0.42 
0.89 
The Cronbach alpha for budgetary participation, organisational commitment, trust and 
job related tension were 0.79, 0.86, 0.84, and 0.89 respectively, thus indicating high 
internal consistency. In contrast, the Cronbach alpha for propensity to create slack was 
relatively low at only 0.42. The instrument for propensity to create slack is Onsi's 
(1973) four item instrument. Prior studies have reported satisfactory Cronbach alpha 
statistics for this instrument, (eg., 0.7 for Merchant, 1985; 0.75 for Nouri, 1994; 0.75 
for Nouri & Parker, 1996; 0.74 for Lal et al., 1996; 0.62 for Lau & Eggleton, 1998). 
The low score obtained for this variable in this thesis may pose as a limitation to the 
reported results. 
93 
Test for Adequacy of Models 
Regression models were used for testing the hypotheses of this thesis. Before 
commencing on tests of hypotheses, it was important to test if the models chosen to 
analyse the data were appropriate and valid. The analysis of the residuals would 
determine the validity of the assumptions of the analytical models used. The 
assumptions are that the underlying relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables are approximately linear, and that the error terms are 
independently and normally distributed with mean zero and variance cr (Montgomery 
and Peck, 1982, p. 57). 
The normal probability plot of the residuals is a common test for normality, which 
compares the cumulative distribution of actual data values with the cumulative 
distribution of a normal distribution (Hair, et al., 1995). Appendix D shows the,normal 
probability plots of the residuals of the regression models used in this thesis. As the 
normal probability plots show relatively straight lines for all models, it can be 
concluded that the normality assumption was not violated in this study. These results 
indicate that the linear regression models used in this thesis were adequate as the 
assumptions of the models were satisfied by the data. Thus, the analysis of the 
hypotheses using the regression models could be undertaken with confidence. 
94 
Pearson Correlation Matrix for Independent and Dependent Variables 
Table 5.7 shows the correlation coefficients using the Pearson pairwise correlations 
between the independent variables of budget emphasis, budgetary participation, 
organisational commitment, and trust, as well as the dependent variables of the 
propensity to create slack and job related tension. 
Table 5.7 
Pearson Correlation Matrix for Independent and Dependent Variables 
(standardised) 
x, 
X2 
X3 
X4 
X5 
x6 
** 
* 
Budget Emphasis 
Budgetary Participation 
Trust 
Organisational Commitment 
Job Related Tension 
Propensity to create slack 
p < 0.01 (2-tailed) 
p< 0.05 (2-tailed) 
x, X2 X3 X4 Xs x6 
1.000 
0.341.. 1.000 
0.399 .. 0.291.. 1.000 
0.127 0.316.. 0.449.. 1.000 
-0.303 .. -0.375 .. -0.495 .. -0.477 .. 1.000 
-0.204. -0.018 -0.288 .. -0.140 0.296 •• 1.000 
95 
Hypotheses to be tested 
The hypotheses formulated in chapter 3 are as follows: 
H1: The extent of budgetary participation among Norwegian managers is high. 
H2.1: Budget emphasis is negatively associated with job related tension in the 
Norwegian high participatory environment. 
H2_2: Budget emphasis is negatively associated with subordinates' propensity to 
create slack in the Norwegian high participatory environment. 
Model One: 
H3_1: Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through trust. 
H3_2: Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through 
trust. 
Hu: Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through 
budgetary participation. 
H42 : Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through 
budgetary participation. 
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H5.1: Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on job related tension through 
trust. 
H5_2: Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack 
through trust. 
Model Two: 
8<;_1: Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through 
organisational commitment. 
H6.2 : Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through 
organisational commitment. 
H1.1: Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on job related tension through 
budgetary participation. 
H72 : Budget emphasis has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack through 
budgetary participation. 
H8.1: Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on job related tension through 
organisational commitment. 
Hs2: Budgetary participation has an indirect effect on propensity to create slack 
through organisational commitment. 
97 
Results for Hypothesis Hl 
-
Before other hypotheses were tested, it was necessary to ascertain if the Norwegian 
environment was associated with high participation as hypothesised in hypothesis Hl, 
which states that the extent of budgetary participation among Norwegian manager is 
high. Table 5.6 indicates that the theoretical range of participation is from 6 to 42. The 
actual mean participation score is 36.42 out of a maximum of 42. This actual mean is 
considerably higher than the theoretical mean of 24. The actual minimum score of 14 
is also considerably higher than the theoretical minimum of 6. 
Table 5.8 also presents the descriptive statistics of budgetary participation as measured 
by the Milani instrument by some of the prior studis in this research area undertaken 
in different countries. Note that mean participation score of 36.42 for Norway in this 
study is much higher than those found in other countries, including the U.S.A., 
Singapore and Australia. The standard deviation of 4.63 for the Norwegian managers' 
participation scores is also smaller than those of the other countries. Finally, the range 
of 28 is also small relative to those of the other countries. Overall, the results in Tables 
5.6 and 5.8 support the expectation that Norway has a high participatory environment. 
Hypothesis H 1 is therefore supported. 
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Table 5.8 
Descriptive statistics of Participation scores with Milani's instrument 
Studies Mean Std dev Min Max Range 
Norway 36.42 4.63 14 42 28 
(Present study) 
USA 28.18 6.69 6 40 34 
(Nouri & Parker, 1998) 
Singapore 30.65 7.63 6 42 36 
(Lau et al., 1995) 
Australia & Singapore 26.87 8.28 7 42 35 
(Harrison, 1992) 
Australia 31.21 7.49 6 42 36 
(Brownell & Dunk, 1991) 
Australia 27.04 8.95 6 42 36 
(Brownell & Hirst, 1986) 
Australia 25.79 7.10 13 39 26 
(Brownell 1982a) 
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Results for Hypotheses Hl.1 and Hl.2 (Budget emphasis and job related 
tension/propensity to create slack) 
The zero-order correlations between the variables examined in this thesis are 
presented in Table 5.7. The results indicates that budget emphasis is significantly and 
negatively associated with job related tension (r = -0.303; p<0.01), and with 
propensity to create slack (r = -0.204; p<0.05). Hypothesis H2.1, which states that 
budget emphasis is negatively related to job related tension, and hypothesis H2.2, 
which states that budget emphasis is negatively associated with propensity to create 
slack in the Norwegian high participatory environment, are both supported. 
Path Analytical Model for Hypotheses H3 - HS 
A path analytic technique was used to test the hypothesised relationships for 
hypotheses H3 to HS. This technique allows the examination of the direct, indirect and 
spurious effects (Duncan, 1966; Alwin & Hauser, 1975; Asher, 1983; Greene, 1977; 
Lewis-Beck, l 980). The path models used in the analysis correspond to the theoretical 
models in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2. These models show the links between the variables where 
each variable has a path coefficient that measures the number of standard deviations of 
j associated with a one standard deviations change in i. For example, the path 
coefficient for the link between budget emphasis and budgetary participation indicates 
the increase in budget emphasis, measured in the number of standard deviations, 
associated with a one standard deviation increase in budgetary participation (Nouri & 
Parker, 1998, p. 473). 
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The values for path coefficients were estimated using regression and correlation 
analysis, where the path coefficient is the standardised beta coefficient found by 
- . 
regressing the outcome variable on the appropriate variables (Asher, 1983). The 
following equations represent the structural models examined: 
Model One {la) JRT and Model One {lb) PTCS 
X2 = P21X1 + P2aRa 
X3 = P32X2 + P31X1+ p3bllti 
X5 = Ps1X1 + P52X2 + P53X3 + PscR: 
X(i = P61X1 + P62X2 +P63X3 + p6dR.i 
~x!,~ 
X1 ==---------
X5IX(, 
(la) 
(2a) 
(3a) 
(4a) 
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Model Two (la) JRT and Model Two (lb) PTCS 
X2 = P21X1 + P;aRa (lb) 
'4 = P42X2 + P41X1+ p4bRti (2b) 
Xs = Ps1X1 + Ps2X2 + Ps4'4 + PscRc (3b) 
X6 = P61X1 + P62X2+P64'4 + p6dR! (4b) 
X2 
x,0 x/~ 
where x1 = budget emphasis 
x2 = budgetary participation 
X3 = trust 
x.i = organisational commitment 
x5 = job related tension 
X6 = propensity to create slack 
Pij = the standardised partial regression coefficients (path coefficient) 
Ri = the standardised residuals 
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Hypotheses H3.1 and H4.1 (Indirect effect of budget emphasis on job related 
tension via trust and participation) 
This section presents the results of the hypotheses tests for hypotheses 3.1 and 4.1 of 
model 1 (a). 
Trust and Job related tension (Model la) 
BP 
X2 I"'-
"'- ~.I 
~1 ~ 
BE 
• X1 
Fig. 5.1 
TR 
X3 
HJ.I 
• JRT 
X5 
Hypothesis H3.1 states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis 
and job related tension through trust, and hypothesis H4.1 states that there is an 
indirect relationship between budget emphasis and job related tension through 
participation. Table 5.9 presents the values of the path coefficients of the various 
relationships and are calculated in accordance with the equations 1 a, 2a and 3a for 
Model 1 for Job Related Tension. The indirect effect of budget emphasis on job 
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related tension consist of the following paths and are calculated based on the values of 
the path coefficients in Table 5.9: 
Path (1) 
Path (2) 
Path (3) 
BE-BP-JRT 
BE - BP - TR - JRT 
BE-TR-JRT 
Total indirect effect 
0.341 * -0.237 = -0.081 
0.341 * 0.175 * -0.401 = -0.024 
0.339 * -0.401 = -0.136 
= -0.241 
Path ( 1) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via budgetary participation, which is 
-0.81. Paths (2) and (3) indicate the indirect effect through trust, which is -0.16 (Nouri 
& Parker, 1998). These results show that the relationship between budget emphasis 
and job related tension comprises two effects. First, there is a direct effect of -0.062 
(see Table 5.9). Second, there is an indirect effect of -0.241, which can be further 
decomposed into the portion attributabe to participation (-0.081) and the portion 
attributable to trust (-0.16). According to Bartol (1983, p.809), an indirect effect in 
excess of 0.05 may be considered meaningful. Based on these results, hypotheses H3.l 
and H4.1 are both supported. 
104 
Table 5.9 
Path Analysis Results (model la) 
Dependent 
variable 
BP 
TR 
JRT 
Independent 
variables 
BE 
BE 
BP 
BE 
BP 
TR 
Path 
coefficient 
0.341 
0.339 
0.175 
-0.062 
-0.237 
-0.401 
t-value p-value R2 
3.945 0.001 0.117 
3.827 0.001 0.186 
1.973 0.051 
-0.708 0.481 0.306 
-2.840 0.005 
-4.682 0.001 
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Hypotheses HS.1 (Indirect effect of participation on job related tension via trust) 
Hypothesis HS. I states that there is an indirect relationship between budgetary 
participation and job related tension through trust. The indirect effect and the spurious 
effect consist of the following paths and are computed based on the values of the path 
coefficients in Table 5.9: 
Path (1) 
Path (2) 
Path (3) 
BP-TR-JRT 
BP- BE -JRT 
BP - BE - TR - JRT 
Total indirect effect 
0.175 * -0.401 
0.341 * -0.062 
= -0.0701 
= -0.0211 
0.341 * 0.339 * -0.401 = -0.0464 
= -0.1376 
Path (1) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via trust is -0.07. Paths (2) and (3) 
indicate a spurious effect of -0.0675. As the indirect effect via trust is in excess of 0.05 
(Bartol, 1983), hypothesis HS. l is supported. 
Model one indicates that there is also an indirect relationship between budget 
emphasis and trust through participation. The indirect effect of budget emphasis and 
trust is calculated as follows: 
Path (1) BE-BP-TR 0.341 * 0.175 = 0.060 
Table 5.10 presents a decomposition of the observed correlations for model l (a). 
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Table 5.10 
Decomposition of observed correlations (model lb) 
Observed Direct 
Relations correlation (a) effect (b) 
BE/JRT 
BE/BP 
BP/TR 
BE/TR 
TR/JRT 
BP/JRT 
** p<0.01 
* p<0.10 
-0.303** 
+0.341** 
+0.291 ** 
+0.399** 
-0.495** 
-0.375** 
(a) from Table 5.7 
(b) from Table 5.9 
-0.062 
+0.341 ** 
+0.175* 
+0.339** 
-0.401 ** 
-0.237** 
Indirect 
effect 
-0.241 
+0.060 
-0.070 
Spurious 
effect 
+0.116 
-0.094 
-0.068 
107 
Hypotheses H3.2 and H4.2 (Indirect effect of budget emphasis on propensity to 
create slack via trust and participation) 
This section presents the results of the hypotheses tests for hypotheses 3.2 and 4.2 of 
model 1 (b). 
Trust and Propensity to create slack (Model lb) 
Fig. 5.2 
BE 
XJ • 
BP 
X2 ·~ 
~ ~-2 
1-------'l ~ 
TR 
X3 
H32 
• PTCS 
Xo 
Hypothesis H3 .2 states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis 
and propensity to create slack through trust, and hypothesis H4.2 states that there is an 
indirect relationship between budget emphasis and propensity to create slack through 
participation. Table 5.11 presents the values of the path coefficients of the various 
relationships and are calculated in accordance with the equations 1 a, 2a and 4a for 
Model l(b) for Propensity to Create Slack. Similarly to model 1 (a) the indirect effect 
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of budget emphasis on propensity to create slack consist of the following paths and are 
calculated based on the values of the path coefficients in Table 5.11: 
Path (I) 
Path (2) 
Path (3) 
BE-BP-PTCS 0.341 * 0.104 = 0.035 
BE- BP-TR- PTCS 0.341 * 0.175 * -0.264 = -0.016 
BE - TR - PTCS 0.339 * -0.262 = -0.089 
Total indirect effect = -0.070 
Path (1) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via budgetary participation, is 0.035. 
Paths (2) and (3) indicate the indirect effect through trust, which is -0.105. These 
results show that the relationship between budget emphasis and propensity to create 
slack comprises two effects, which are the direct effect of-0.134 (see Table 5.11) and 
the indirect effect of -0.070. The total indirect effect can be further decomposed into 
the portion attributable to participation (0.035) and the portion attributable to trust (-
0. l 05). Recall, that according to Bartol (l 983, p. 809), an indirect effect in excess of 
0.05 may be considered meaningful. Hence, hypothesis H3.2 (indirect effect less than 
0.05) is not supported. However hypothesis H4.2 is supported. 
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Table 5.11 
Path Analysis Results (model lb) 
Dependent 
variable 
BP 
TR 
PTCS 
Independent 
variables 
BE 
BE 
BP 
BE 
BP 
TR 
Path 
coefficient 
0.341 
0.339 
0.175 
-0.134 
0.104 
-0.262 
t-value p-value R2 
3.945 0.001 0.117 
3.827 0.001 0.186 
1.973 0.051 
-1.351 0.090 0.101 
1.097 0.138 
-2.710 0.004 
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Hypotheses H5.2 (Indirect effect of participation on propensity to create slack via 
trust) 
Hypothesis HS .2 states that there is an indirect relationship between budgetary 
participation and propensity to create slack through trust. The indirect effect and the 
spurious effect consist of the following paths and are computed based on the values of 
the path coefficients in Table 5.11: 
Path (1) 
Path (2) 
Path (3) 
BP-TR-PTCS 
BP-BE-PTCS 
BP - BE - TR - PTCS 
Total indirect effect 
0.175 * -0.262 = -0.0459 
0.341 * -0.134 = -0.0456 
0.341 * 0.339 * -0.262 = -0.0303 
= -0.1218 
Path (1) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via trust is -0.0459. Paths (2) and (3) 
indicate a spurious effect of -0.0759. The indirect effect via trust is just below the limit 
of0.05 (Bartol, 1983). Hence hypothesis HS.2 is marginally supported. 
Model l (b) also indicates that there is an indirect relationship between budget 
emphasis and trust through participation. The indirect effect of budget emphasis and 
trust is calculated as follows (which is identical to model 1 (a): 
Path (1) BE-BP-TR 0.341 * 0.175 = 0.060 
Table 5.12 presents a decomposition of the observed correlations for model 1 (b). 
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Table 5.12 
Decomposition of observed correlations (model lb) 
Observed Direct 
Relations correlation (a) effect (b) 
BE/PTCS 
BE/BP 
BP/TR 
BE/TR 
TR/PTCS 
BP/PTCS 
** p<0.01 
* p<0.10 
-0.204* 
+0.341 ** 
+0.291 ** 
+0.399** 
-0.288** 
-0.018 
(a) from Table 5.7 
(b) from Table 5.10 
-0.134 
+0.341 ** 
+0.175* 
+0.339** 
-0.262** 
+0.104* 
Indirect 
effect 
-0.070 
+0.060 
-0.046 
Spurious 
effect 
+0.116 
-0.026 
-0.076 
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Hypotheses H6.l and H7.l (Indirect effect of budget emphasis on job related 
tension via organisational commitment and participation) 
This section presents the results of the hypotheses tests for hypotheses 6.1 and 7 .1 of 
model 2 (a). 
Organisational commitment and Job related tension (Model la) 
BE 
• x, 
Fig. 5.3 
BP 
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Hypothesis H6. l states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis 
and job related tension through organisational commitment, and hypothesis H7. l 
states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis and job related 
tension through participation. Table 5 .13 presents the values of the path coefficients of 
the various relationships and are calculated in accordance with the equations 1 b, 2b 
and 3b for Model 2 {a) for Job Related Tension. Accordingly, the indirect effect of 
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budget emphasis on job related tension consist of the following paths and are 
calculated based on the values of the path coefficients in Table 5 .13: 
Path (1) 
Path (2) 
Path (3) 
BE- BP-JRT 
BE - BP - OC - JRT 
BE-OC -JRT 
Total indirect effect 
0.341 * -0.186 = -0.064 
0.341 * 0.308 * -0.394 = -0.041 
0.022 * -0.394 = -0.009 
= -0.114 
Path (I) shows that the indirect effect between budget emphasis and job related 
tension is exclusively via budgetary participation, which is -0.64. Paths (2) and (3) 
indicate the indirect effect through organisatinoal commitment, which is -0.050. These 
results show that the relationship between budget emphasis and job related tension 
comprises two effects. First, there is a direct effect of -0.189 (see Table 5.13). Second, 
there is an indirect effect of -0.154, which can be further decomposed into the portion 
attributabe to participation (-0.064) and the portion attributable to organisational 
commitment (-0.050). As both indirect effects, (0.064) and (0.050) are in excess of 
0.05, hypotheses H6. l and H7. I are both supported. 
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Table 5.13 
Path Analysis Results (model 2a) 
Dependent 
variable 
BP 
oc 
JRT 
Independent 
variables 
BE 
BE 
BP 
BE 
BP 
oc 
Path 
coefficient 
0.341 
0.022 
0.308 
-0.189 
-0.186 
-0.394 
t-value p-value R2 
3.945 0.001 0.117 
0.233 0.204 0.100 
3.303 0.000 
-2.316 0.011 0.315 
-2.178 0.016 
-4.869 0.000 
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Hypotheses H8.1 (Indirect effect of participation on job related tension via 
organisational commitment) 
Hypothesis HS. I states that there is an indirect relationship between budgetary 
participation and job related tension through organisational commitment. The indirect 
effect and the spurious effect consist of the following paths and are computed based 
on the values of the path coefficients in Table 5 .13: 
Path (1) 
Path (2) 
Path (3) 
BP-OC-JRT 
BP -BE-JRT 
BP - BE - OC - JRT 
Total indirect effect 
0.308 * -0.394 
0.341 * -0.189 
= -0.121 
= -0.065 
0.341 * 0.022 * -0.394 = -0.003 
= -0.189 
Path (I) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via budgetary participation, which is -
0.121. Paths (2) and (3) indicate a spurious effect of -0.068. As the indirect effect via 
participation is in excess of0.05 (Bartol, 1983), hypothesis HS.I is also supported. 
Model 2 (a) indicates that there is also an indirect relationship between budget 
emphasis and organisational commitment through participation. The indirect effect of 
budget emphasis and organisational commitment is calculated as follows: 
Path (1) BE-BP-OC 0.341 * 0.308 = 0.105 
Table 5.14 presents a decomposition of the observed correlations for model 2 (a). 
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Table 5.14 
Decomposition of observed correlations (model 2a) 
Observed Direct 
Relations correlation (a) effect (b) 
BE/JRT 
BE/BP 
BP/OC 
BE/OC 
OC/JRT 
BP/JRT 
** p<0.01 
* p<0.10 
-0.303** 
+0.341 ** 
+0.316** 
+0.127 
-0.477** 
-0.375** 
(a) from Table 5.7 
(b) from Table 5.9 
-0.189* 
+0.341 ** 
+0.308** 
+0.022* 
-0.394** 
-0.186** 
Indirect 
effect 
-0.114 
-0.105 
-0.121 
Spurious 
effect 
+0.008 
-0.083 
-0.068 
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Hypotheses H6.2 and H7.2 (Indirect effect of budget emphasis on propensity to 
create slack via organisational commitment and participation) 
This section presents the results of the hypotheses tests for hypotheses 6.2 and 7.2 of 
model 2 (b). 
Trust and Propensity to create slack {Model lb) 
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X2 
-
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-
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Hypothesis H6.2 states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis 
and propensity to create slack through organisational commitment, and hypothesis 
H7 .2 states that there is an indirect relationship between budget emphasis and 
propensity to create slack through participation. Table 5 .15 presents the values of the 
path coefficients of the various relationships and are calculated in accordance with the 
equations I b, 2b and 3b for Model 2(b) for Propensity to Create Slack. Similarly to 
model I (b) the indirect effect of budget emphasis on propensity to create slack consist 
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of the following paths and are calculated based on the values of the path coefficients 
in Table 5.15: 
Path (1) 
Path (2) 
Path (3) 
BE-BP-PTCS 0.341 * 0.103 = 0.035 
BE- BP - OC - PTCS 0.341 * 0.308 * -0.144 = -0.015 
BE- OC - PTCS 0.022 * -0.144 = -0.003 
Total indirect effect = 0.017 
Path (1) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via budgetary participation, which is 
0.035. Paths (2) and (3) indicate the indirect effect through organisational 
commitment, which is -0.018. These results show that the relationship between budget 
emphasis and propensity to create slack comprises two effects, which are the direct 
effect of -0.221 (see Table 5.15) and the indirect effect of -'-0.017. The total indirect 
effect can be further decomposed into the portion attributabe to participation (-0.03 5) 
and the portion attributable to organisational commitment (-0.018). Since both indirect 
effects are less than 0.05, neither H6.2 nor 7.2 are supported. 
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TableS.15 
Path Analysis Results (model 2b) 
Dependent 
variable 
BP 
oc 
PTCS 
Independent 
variables 
BE 
BE 
BP 
BE 
BP 
oc 
Path 
coefficient 
0.341 
0.022 
0.308 
-0.221 
0.103 
-0.144 
t-value p-value R2 
3.945 0.001 0.117 
0.233 0.408 0.100 
3.303 0.000 
-2.309 0.012 0.063 
1.026 0.154 
-1.522 0.065 
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Hypotheses H8.2 (Indirect effect of participation on propensity to create slack via 
organisational commitment) 
Hypothesis H8.2 states that there is an indirect relationship between budgetary 
participation and propensity to create slack through organisational commitment. The 
indirect effect and the spurious effect consist of the following paths and are computed 
based on the values of the path coefficients in Table 5.15: 
Path (l) 
Path (2) 
Path (3) 
BP-OC-PTCS 
BP- BE-PTCS 
0.308 * -0.144 
0.341 * -0.22 l 
= -0.044 
= -0.076 
BP - BE - OC - PTCS 0.341 * 0.022 * -0.144 = -0.001 
Total indirect effect = -0.121 
Path (I) indicates the indirect effect exclusively via organisational commitment is -
0.04. Paths (2) and (3) indicate a spurious effect of -0.077. As the indirect effect via 
organisational commitment is lower than 0.05 (Bartol, 1983), hypothesis H8.2 is not 
supported. 
Model 2 (b) also indicates that there is an indirect relationship between budget 
emphasis and organisational commitment through participation. The indirect effect of 
budget emphasis and organisational commitment is calculated as follows: 
Path (1) BE- BP -OC 0.341 * 0.308 = 0.105 
Table 5 .16 presents a decomposition of the observed correlations for model 2 (b ). 
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Table 5.16 
Decomposition of observed correlations (model 2b) 
Observed Direct 
Relations correlation (a) effect (b) 
BE/PTCS 
BE/BP 
BP/OC 
BE/OC 
OC/PTCS 
BP/PTCS 
** p<0.01 
* p<0.10 
-0.204* 
+0.341 ** 
+0.316** 
+0.127 
-0.140 
-0.018 
(a) from Table 5.7 
(b) from Table 5.10 
-0.221 * 
+0.341 ** 
+0.308* 
+0.022* 
-0.144* 
+0.103* 
Indirect 
effect 
+0.017 
+0.105 
-0.044 
Spurious 
effect 
+0.008 
+0.004 
-0.077 
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Conclusion 
The analysis of the hypotheses was conducted by utilising path analysis. When one is 
constructing structural models there are a few questions that need to be answered. For 
instance, are the variables measured related, or in other words, is there a significant 
non-zero correlation. If so, is this relationship spurious, that is, is the only relation 
between the two variables based on their mutual dependence on another variable. 
Finally, if the correlation is nonspurious, what is then the causal linkage between the 
variables? (Heise, 1982). The benefit of such a structural model is the ability to break 
down empirically observed correlations into parts that are due to different processes. 
This is the strength of the models used in this thesis. 
Table 5.17 presents the summarised results for this study. 
Model One 
Overall, the results offered support for some of the stated hypotheses. With regard to 
model one (trust), the results showed that budget emphasis and budgetary 
participation are directly related. Hence the literature on the beneficial effects of a 
compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high participation is further 
supported ( eg., Brownell, 1982; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Brownell & Dunk, 1991; 
Lau & Eggleton, 1998). Trust was also found to be strongly related to job related 
tension (see model la). Similarly, budgetary participation and job related tension were 
also significantly related. No significant relationship between budget emphasis and job 
related tension was also found. Both budgetary participation and trust were also found 
to have an intervening effects on the relationship between budget emphasis and job 
related tension. 
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Trust was also found to be directly related to budgetary participation and propensity to 
create slack (Model 1 b ). However, no significant direct relationships were found 
between (i) budget emphasis and propensity to create slack, and (ii) budgetary 
participation and propensity to create slack. Hence, it is not possible to conclude that 
budget emphasis or budgetary participation are negatively related to slack creation. 
More importantly, this study found that budgetary participation and trust have 
intervening effects on the relationship between supervisory evaluative styles and the 
propensity to create slack. 
Model two 
Model two revealed that organisational commitment was related to budgetary 
participation, which is supported by prior studies (e.g., Welsch & LaVan, 1981; 
DeCotiis & Summers, 1987; Nouri & Parker, 1996, 1998). The findings also indicated 
that organisational commitment is negatively related to propensity to create slack 
(although only marginally) and job related tension. Model two showed that the 
relationship between supervisory evaluative styles and job related tension is similarly 
affected by the intervening effects of budgetary participation and organisational 
commitment. However, with regard to model 2 (b), the indirect effect of budgetary 
participation and organisational commitment on the relationship between budget 
emphasis and propensity to create slack was negligible. 
In conclusion, this study found that trust, and to a lesser extent, organisational 
commitment have a mediating effect between budget emphasis and propensity to 
create slack. However, both variables acted as mediating variables between the 
relationships of budget emphasis, budgetary participation and job related tension. 
Hence, we can conclude that trust · and organisational commitment are important 
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variables in explaining the relationship between superior evaluative styles and 
subordinates behaviours. 
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CHAPTER6 
Discussion & Conclusions 
Introduction 
This thesis examined the relationships between the independent variables of budget 
emphasis, the intervening variables of budgetary participation, organisational 
commitment, and trust, and the dependent variables of propensity to create slack and 
job related tension in the Norwegian environment. Using data from a Scandinavian 
nation enabled the research on supervisory evaluative styles to be extended to a 
relatively unexplored cultural region. 
The motivations for this study are (i) to extend further research on supervisory 
evaluative styles, and (ii) to extend the research in this area to a cultural region not 
studied previously. Prior studies on culture have concentrated on high power 
distance/low individualism nations in Asia versus low power distance/high 
individualism nations in the Anglo-American block, where Australia has frequently 
been proxied as a nation in this cultural block ( e.g., Hwang, 1989; Harrison, 1991; 
Harrison et al., 1996; Lau et al., 1995, 1997; Lau & Tan, 1998). European nations, 
particularly Scandinavian countries such as Norway, have to date been barely explored 
(Lau & Buckland, 1999). 
A questionnaire was used on a sample of functional heads drawn from the Norwegian 
manufacturing industry. The data were analysed by path analysis which enabled the 
interpretation of the causal relationships among the different variables to be 
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undertaken. Of special interest was the effect of trust and organisational commitment 
on the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary participation, on the one 
hand, and slack or job related tension on the other. 
Findings of the study 
The major findings of this study are presented in Table 5.17 in chapter 5. They are as 
follows: 
(i) Norway has a high participatory environment. 
Model One 
a) Job related tension 
(i) There is a significant positive direct relationship between budget emphasis 
and budgetary participation, (p < 0.000). 
(ii) The relationships between (i) budget emphasis and job related tension is 
indirect through a mediating effect of budgetary participation and trust (total 
indirect effect: -0.241) and (ii) budgetary participation and job related tension 
is also indirectly via trust (-0.138). 
(iii) The causal relationship between budgetary participation and job related 
tension is both direct (-0.237, p< 0.005) and indirect (-0.07) via trust. 
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b) Propensity to create slack 
-(iv) The relationships between (i) budget emphasis and propensity to create slack 
was indirect via budgetary participation and trust (total indirect effect: -0.070), 
and (ii) budgetary participation and propensity to create slack was also 
indirectly via trust (-0.123 ). 
(v) The relationship between budgetary participation and propensity to create 
slack is both direct (0.104, p < 0.000) and indirect (-0.077) via trust. 
Model Two 
a) Job related tension 
(vi) The relationships between (i) budget emphasis and job related tension is 
partially moderated by budgetary participation and organisational 
commitment (total indirect effect: -0.114), and (ii) budgetary participation and 
job related tension is mediated by organisational commitment (-0.189). 
(vii) The relationship between budgetary participation and job related tension is 
both direct (-0.186) and indirect via organisational commitment and budgetary 
participation (-0.121). 
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b) Propensity to create slack 
-(viii) No intervening effects of budgetary participation and organisational 
commitment on the relationships between budget emphasis and the propensity 
to create slack was found (0.017). 
(ix) Organisational commitment was found to have only a small intervening effect 
on the relationship between budgetary participation and propensity to create 
slack (-0.044). 
Based on these results, the following conclusions may be made. First, as Norway has a 
high participatory environment, it may be regarded as surrogate for high participation. 
Second, consistent with the theory suggested by Brownell (1982a) and the results of a 
number of prior studies including Brownell (1982a), a compatible combination of high 
budget emphasis and high participation will lead to lower job related tension than a 
mismatched combination of low budget emphasis and high participation combination. 
Third, the direct effect of high budget emphasis and high participation (Norway) is 
small. The effect is mainly indirect through trust and participation. Fourth, a 
compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high participation will lead to a 
higher level of trust between the subordinates and their superior than a mismatched 
combination of low budget emphasis and high participation. Fifth, since trust is higher 
between the subordinates and their superior in a high budget emphasis and high 
participation situation, subordinates will experience lower job related tension. These 
results, derived from an intervening model, therefore provide valuable insight which 
helps to explain why a compatible combination of high budget emphasis and high 
participation, found by a number of prior studies with the contingency model, can lead 
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to better behavioural outcomes than other combinations of budget emphasis and 
participation. 
Discussion of results 
With respect to the relationship between budget emphasis and budgetary participation, 
a significant relationship was found. Hence, the findings of this study reinforce 
Brownell's (1982) contention that a compatible mix of high budget emphasis and high 
participation will have favourable outcomes. Prior studies have consistently supported 
the expectation of beneficial consequences associated with compatible match of high 
budget emphasis and high participation ( eg., Brownell, 1982; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; 
Brownell & Dunk, 1991; Harrison, 1992; Lau et al., 1995, Lau & Eggleton, 1998, Lau 
& Buckland, 1999) With respect to the effect budget emphasis and participation have 
on slack creation and job related tension, this thesis revealed that the relationships are 
in most cases affected by the intervening variables trust and organisational 
commitment. These findings are reinforced by the lack of significant relationships 
between budget emphasis or budgetary participation on the propensity to create slack. 
For instance, model 1 (b) found no direct link between budget emphasis and 
propensity to create slack. These results are consistent with the findings of Collins 
( 1978), who also found no significant relationship between budget pressure and the 
extent of budgetary slack creation. Similarly, no link was found between budgetary 
participation and slack creation. Prior findings on the effect of participation and slack 
have been rather inconsistent. Although some studies found participation to have an 
effect on slack, they were not consistent with respect to which direction that applies, 
being either positive or negative (e.g., Onsi, 1973; Merchant, 1985; Young, 1985; 
Govindarajan, 1986; Lukka, 1988). The findings therefore indicate that the 
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relationship between superior evaluative styles and propensity to create slack involved 
other intervening variables. 
Further, it was also found that budgetary participation has a negative direct effect on 
job related tension. These results are consitent with prior studies which have found 
participation and job outcomes to be highly related ( eg., Argyris, 1952; Becker & 
Green, 1962; Hofstede, 1968; Locke & Schweiger, 1979; Mechant, 1981; Brownell, 
1982). Whilst many of these studies have mostly examined the effect of participation 
on either job performance or job satisfaction, and, only a few have examined the effect 
of participation on job related tension (eg., Brownell & Hirst, 1986), the findings may 
be inter-related. Jamal ( 1985) found job related tension to be associated with 
managerial performance and Jaworski & Young (1992) found job related tension and 
dysfunctional behavior to be related. Hence, the findings of this thesis are consistent 
with many of these prior studies. 
As mentioned, the relationships between either budget emphasis (and/or budgetary 
participation) and slack creation and job related tension could be affected by other 
intervening variables. One such variable investigated in this thesis was trust. Trust was 
found to be positively and directly associated with budgetary participation, and 
together with budgetary participation to have an intervening effect on the relationship 
between budget emphasis and propensity to create slack, which is in accordance with 
the theory developed in this thesis. It was argued in this thesis that a budget based 
evaluative style (where targets are objective and verifiable) implemented in a high 
participating environment, would increase the level of trust experienced by the 
subordinates. 
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This thesis also found that the effect of trust was negative on both propensity to create 
slack and job related tension. Moreover, the intervening effects of budgetary 
participation and trust were even bigger than the direct effect of budget ·emphasis on 
job related tension. Also, trust was found to have a considerable intervening effect on 
the relationship between budgetary participation and both slack creation and job 
related tension. In other words, trust has a strong beneficial impact on behavioural 
outcomes in an organisation. 
Both Dunk (1993) and Lau & Eggleton (1998) found a significant three-way 
interaction among budget emphasis, participation and information asymmetry 
affecting budgetary slack. Thus, this thesis provided an extension to these prior studies 
by including trust as an intervening variable. As mentioned, it was found in this thesis 
that trust has a partial mediation effect on both the relationships between budget 
emphasis and slack, and budgetary participation and slack creation. It therefore 
conforms to Read's ( 1962) suggestion that trust has a strong effect on the 
communication relationships within an organisation, and to Lau & Eggleton's (1998) 
suggestion that subordinates will not create slack in order to not jeopardise the level of 
trust the superiors have in them. These results provide empirical support for the 
suggestions of these prior studies. Ross (1994) also investigated the importance of 
trust on the relationship between evaluative styles and job related tension. Hence, the 
results of this thesis provided further support for his findings. The results of this thesis 
indicate that participation also has a significant direct effect on job related tension. 
This means that participation will reduce tension directly. However, trust will further 
enhance this process. 
This thesis also included an examination of organisational commitment as an 
intervening variable shown in model two. The existence of a significant relationship 
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between budgetary participation and organisational commitment found in this thesis 
was in accordance with expectation. One important consequence of participation has 
been found to be motivation ( eg., Argyris, 1952; Becker & Green, 1962; Hotstede, 
1968). Motivation was found to be an important characteristic of those individuals 
who feel strongly committed to their organisation. These results are also consistent 
with those of Nouri & Partker ( 1996) who also studied the link between participation 
and organisational commitment. These findings also support the contention by Hanson 
( 1966), that individuals who are involved in the creation of the budgets will better 
identify themselves with both budget objectives and organisational goals. Also, the 
results of this thesis are consistent with studies by Welsch & LaVan (1981) and 
DeCotiis & Summers ( 1987), who also reported that employee participation and 
organisational commitment are positively related. 
Organisational commitment was found to be significant related to slack creation. This 
thesis is therefore able to support the findings of Nouri & Parker ( 1996) who found a 
link between organisational commitment and slack. With respect to the relationship 
between organisational commitment and job related tension, the findings of this thesis 
indicate a significant direct relationship. The literature is rather consistent with regard 
to the effects of organisational commitment on job satisfaction ( eg., Welsch & La Van, 
1981; Aranya et al., 1982; Norris & Niebuhr, 1983; Meixner & Bline, 1989; 
Poznanski & Bine, 1997) or job performance (Nouri & Parker, 1988). Consequently, it 
seems that the effect of organisational commitment on job satisfaction, performance 
and job related tension is similar. Finally, it was found that organisational commitment 
acted as an intervening variable between budgetary participation and slack creation 
(see model 2b ). Budgetary participation and organisational commitment also acted as 
intervening variables in the relationship between budget emphasis and job related 
tension, and between budgetary participation and job related tension (see model 2a). 
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Both trust and organisational commitment were found to be strongly linked to how 
much tension a subordinate feels about his/hers job. Considering both variables acted 
as intervening variables between budget emphasis/budgetary participation and 
propensity to create slack/job related tension highlights the need for organisations to 
emphasise their management policies to be aligned with the needs and understandings 
of their subordinates. 
Contributions of the Study 
The major contributions of this study are the findings related to the effects of the 
variables, trust and organisational commitment, in the area of supervisory evaluative 
styles. Trust was found to be a crucial variable when examining the relationship 
between budget emphasis and budgetary participation on the one hand, and their 
effects on slack creation and job related tension on the other. 
Trust was identified as a mediating variable of the relationship between (i) budget 
emphasis and both slack creation and job related tension, and (ii) between budgetary 
participation and both slack creation and job related tension. In addition, trust was also 
found to be negatively related to both slack creation and job related tension. By 
reporting that trust acts as an intervening variable, these results indicate the 
importance of trust as the essential ingredient in every stable social and managerial 
relationship. One implication of these findings is to create an awareness smong senior 
managers that the adoption of strategies to enhance interpersonal trust within the 
organisation may lead to beneficial .consequences such as reduced employees' job 
related tension and slack creation. Along with trust, organisational commitment was 
also found to be an important intervening variable of the relationship between 
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budgetary participation and slack creation, and between budget emphasis and 
budgetary participation and job related tension. Hence, this thesis has contributed to 
the literature on both budgetary slack creation and job attitudes such as job related 
tension. 
In addition, as this thesis has focused on the Norwegian manufacturing industry, the 
results provide further contributions to the knowledge about supervisory evaluative 
styles and its implications for Norwegian managers. As only one prior study in the 
area of supervisory evaluative style have been based on Norwegian managers (Lau & 
Buckland, 1999), the findings of this thesis on trust and organisational commitment as 
essential mediating variables between budget emphasis and job related 
tension/budgetary slack, may provide managers in Norway with a better understanding 
of these relationships, and consequently guide system designers in Norway on how to 
design and implement an effective managerial control system. 
Besides, according to Hofstede's ( 1984) cultural dimensions of power distance and 
individualism, Norway is clustered with other Nordic European countries. This allows 
the results of this thesis to be generalised to other Scandinavian countries, such as 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Given the lack of research along this line in Norway 
and Sweden ( see Hoegheim et al., 1989; Samuelsen, 1986; Jonsson, 1982, who 
focused on budgetary control in government agencies only), an understanding of the 
relationship between budget emphasis, participation, organisational commitment, and 
trust may change managers' attitudes and supervisory styles and ultimately enhance 
the productivity of organisations in this region. Also, since Norway was reported by 
Hofstede ( 1980) to have similar level of power distance and individualism as nations 
in the Anglo-American block, it may be possible to generalise the results of this thesis 
to the Anglo-American block of nations. 
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Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research in this Area 
A number of limitations may have influenced the results of this thesis. First, with 
regard to the reported results on propensity to create slack, the relative weak internal 
reliability of the instrument used to measure the propensity to create slack may have 
influenced the results. Although the results were relatively strong and supportive, the 
Cronback alpha for the slack instrument was only 42 %. Second, this thesis regards 
slack as the understatement of the subordinate's performance capability to make 
budgeted targets easier to attain. Hence, this may restrict the generalisation of the 
results of this thesis to downward biasing only, even though Lowe & Shaw (1968) 
found that upward biasing could also occur (Lau & Eggleton, 1998). 
Third, this thesis had drawn its sample from the functional heads of the manufacturing 
industry. This may pose as another limitation to the generalisability of the results of 
this thesis to other levels of management and also to other types of industry. Hence, 
opportunities exist for testing these models in non-manufacturing industries, for 
instance service industries and across different levels of management. 
More research is also needed to provide support for the generalisation of the results of 
this thesis to other Nordic countries. Two avenues are possible: (i) a comparison 
between Norway or other Scandinavian countries (low power distance/middle to high 
individualism) and nations proxied as high power distance/low individualism (South 
East Asia), and (ii) a comparison between Norway and another Scandinavian country, 
e.g. Sweden or Finland. 
Finally, there may also be some ·problems that are inherently associated with 
questionnaire survey methods. Future research may incorporate different methods for 
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instance, longitudinal studies or in depth case studies. Longitudinal studies would 
assist in the understanding of the interactions between variables on manager 
behaviour, and in depth case studies have the advantage of enabling the researchers.to 
observe the sensitive data. 
Nevertheless, despite the listed limitations above, this thesis has attempted to evaluate 
systematically the impact of trust on management control systems. It has continued to 
advance an important area of management accounting research commencing from the 
pioneer work by Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978) to subsequent contingency 
studies. Further work in this line of research by evaluating systematically other 
variables may help to advance this important area of management accounting research. 
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Footnotes 
l: The exclusion of item 3 in the measurement of organisational commitment 
made a slight difference to the reported results. Organisational commitment was found 
to be marginally significant with propensity to create slack, whereas there was no 
significance when the analysis was based on the full nine-item measure of 
organisational commitment. 
2: The exclusion of item 9 in the measurement of job related tension made no 
difference to the reported results. 
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APPENDIX A 
This appendix contains: 
Copy of letter to manufacturing companies in Norway 
(a) the Norwegian, and 
(b) the English translation 
152 
PRIVAT & KONFIDENSIELT 
Navn 
Tittel 
Finna navn 
Adresse 
1. Juni 1998 
VEDR0RENDE FORSKNINGSPROSJEKT 
Jeg henvender meg til deg for din hjelp og samarbeid til et forskningsprosjekt 
angaende budsjettmiljcp i Norge. Forksningsprosjektet er en del av min Master of 
Business, Accounting utdannelse som jeg fullfcprer i Perth, Vest Australia. 
Bedriften din har blitt valgt ut til a assistere meg med dette studiet som er for 
forskningsfonnal. Prosjektet er bare basert pa norske data, og resultatet er denned 
avhengig av tilstrekkelig antall utfylte skjema. Jeg cpnsker a meddele at all 
infonnasjon vil bli behandlet konfidensielt og bare oppsummerte resultater vii bli 
rapportert. En kopi av de oppsummerte resultater vil bli sent til deg etter anmodning. 
Jeg er veldig takknemlig hvis du tar deg tid til a fylle ut dette spcprsmalsskjema. Det 
skulle ikke ta mer enn ca. 20 minutter. En frankert og adressert svarskonvolutt er 
vedlagt til din fordel. 
Hvis du har noen spcprsmal angaende spcprsmalsskjemaet, kan du kontakte meg 
direkte i Perth pa telefonnummer ( ellers er jeg i Haugesund fra den 12. 
juni pa telefonnummer  
Tusen takk for ditt samarbeid ogjeg ser fram til et snarlig svar. 
Svarfristen er satt til l. juli d.a. 
Med hilsen 
Christin Selsaas Buckland 
Masterstudent 
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PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL 
Name of Manager 
Job Title 
Company Name 
Address 
Western Australia 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: RESEARCH PROJECT 
Date 
I am wntmg to seek your co-operation and assistance in a research project on 
budgetary environment in Norway. The research is part of my Master of Business, 
Accounting degree I am completing in Perth, Western Australia.ficer in charge of a 
particular function such as production, marketing, sales, administration, personnel, 
accounting and other such functions. 
The research project is based entirely on Norwegian data. Therefore in order to obtain 
meaningful results a high response rate is acquired. I am therefore appealing to you to 
assist me so that the body of knowledge on Norwegian companies could be expanded. 
I would be most happy to share the summarised results of this project with you. 
You are kindly requested to assist in this study which is purely for research purposes. I 
wish to assure you that all the information provided will be treated with strictest 
confidence and only summarised results will be reported. A copy of the summarised 
results will be sent to you if you request it. 
I would be most grateful if you could complete this questionnaire. This should not 
take more than twenty minutes of your time. A self-addressed prepaid envelope is 
enclosed for your convenience. 
If you have any queries with the questionnaire, kindly contact Christin Buckland at 
in Perth, or at  in Haugesund after 12 June. 
Thank you very much for your kind cooperation and assistance and hoping for an 
early response from you. Without your help, this research project would not be 
possible. 
Yours sincerely, 
Christin S. Buckland 
Research Scholar 
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This appendix contains: 
(i) A copy of the Norwegian questionnaire 
(ii) A copy of the English questionnaire 
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EDITH COW AN UNIVERSITY 
PERTH WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
FACULTY OF BUSINESS 
SP0RSMALSSKJEMA OM BUDSJETTERINGS MILJ0 
Svarene vii bli behandlet konfidensielt. Ingen i din organisasjon vii ha tilgang til ditt 
spersmAlsskjema. 
Er budsjetter brukt i din organisasjon? Ja D Nei 
Hvis svaret ditt er "Nei",vennligst ikkefyll ut resten av skjemaet. Vennligst send skjemaet ti/ 
meg i den vedlagte 
konvolutten snarest mulig. 
Hvis svaret er "Ja", vennligstfyll ut resten av skjemaet. 
1. Nar din overordnede (din nrermeste sjet) evaluerer din utferelse, hvor mye tror du at 
ban eller hon vektlegger de felgende faktorer? Vennligst svar ved a merke av et 
nummer fra 1 til 7 basert pa felgende skala for hvert punkt nevnt nedenfor. 
l. Aldri av betydning 5. Ofte av betydning 
2. Sjelden av betydning 6. Vanligvis av betydning 
3. Av og til av betydning 7. Alltid av betydning 
4. Noen ganger av betydning 
Aldri av Alltid av 
betydning betydning 
Hvor godt jeg samarbeider med mine medarbeidere. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Al 
Min evne ti! a holde meg innenfor 
pa kort sikt. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 A2 
Hvor godt jeg forholder meg ti! mine overordnede. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 A3 
Hvor mye innsats jeg gir pa jobben. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 A4 
Hvor opptattjeg er av kvaliteter. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 A5 
Min langtidsbekymring for kostnader 
og/eller inntekter. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 A6 
Min holdning til arbeid mitt. l 2 3 4 5 6 ·7 A7 
Min evne til a takle arbeidsmengden min. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 AS 
Min holdning til organisasjonen. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 A9 
Hvor godt jeg samarbeider med individer utenfor 
organisasjonen (f. eks. kunder). l 2 3 4 5 6 7 AlO 
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2. Indiker i hvilken grad hvert av de felgende spersmal om forholdet mellom deg og 
din overordnede du er enig i. Vennligst svar ved a merke av et nummer fra 1 til 5 
basert pa felgend':. skala for hvert punkt. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
I veldig stor grad 
I stor grad 
Ti! noen grad 
4. 
5. 
Ti! liten grad 
Ti! veldig liten grad 
Ti! en stor Ti! en liten 
grad grad 
Benytter din overordnede seg av dine fordeler av muligheter 
som oppstar for a fremme dine interesser ved hans/hennes 
handlinger og beslutninger? 2 3 4 5 Bl 
Hvor fri foler du deg ti! a diskutere med din overordnede 
de problemer og vanskeligheter du bar i ditt arbeid uten a 
risikere din stilling eller a ha "det i mot" deg senere? 2 3 4 5 B2 
Hvor sikker foler du at din overordnede holder deg cerlig og 
holdent informert om saker som kanskje opptar deg? 2 3 4 5 B3 
Noen ganger ma overordnede ta beslutninger som ser ut for a 
vcere imot deres underordnedes interesser. Nar dette bender deg 
som en underordnede, hvor mye ti!lit har du ti! at din over-
ordnedes beslutninger er forsvarlige ved andre vurderinger? 2 3 4 5 B4 
3. Vennligst indiker i hvilken grad du er enig eller uenig med f01gende uttalelser. 
Vennligst svar ved a merke av et nummer fra 1 til 5 basert pa f01lgende skala for 
hvert punkt: 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Svcert uenig 
Moderat uenig 
Lite uenig 
Verken uenig eller enig 
Du har !cert fra dine opplevelser fra de to siste 
arene at du kan stole pa de andre medlemmene 
av toppledelsen. 
Du og de andre ledere uttaler fritt deres ulikheter 
og folelser av modighet eller av skuffelser. 
Du og de andre ledere deler all relevant informasjon 
og utveksler i apenhet og folelser som kanskje er i 
eller utenfor deres definerte ansvarsomrade. 
Resultater oppnas ved et heyt niva av a ta og gi og 
gjensidig tillit ti! hver enkeltes st0tte og evne. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Lite enig 
Moderat enig 
Svcert enig 
Svcert uenig Svcert enig 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cl 
C2 
C3 
C4 
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4. De f0lgende situasjonene kan bli brukt til a beskrive din rolle i utarbeidelse av 
budsjettet for ditt anvarsomrade. Vennligst svar ved a merke av et nummer fra 
1 til 7 basert J!_a skalaen for hvert punkt. 
Hvor engasjert er du i a sette opp ditt budsjett ansvarsomrade? 
Jeg er engasjert i: 
Noe av budsjettet 
l 2 3 4 5 6 
Hele budsjettet 
7 
I bvilken grad bar din overordnede gitt begrunnelse for revisjon til ditt budsjett. 
lngen begrunnelse Omfattende begrunnelse 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hvor ofte gir du din mening om budsjettet ti! din overordnede? 
Aldri Veldig ofte 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hvor mye innflytelse bar du i det endelige budsjettet i ditt ansvarsommrade? 
lngen innflytelse Omfattende innflytelse 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hvor viktig er ditt bidrag til budsjettet? 
Ikke viktig 
l 2 3 4 5 6 
Veldig viktig 
7 
Hvor ofte er du spurt om dine meninger nar budsjettet er under utarbeidelse av din 
overordnede? 
Aldri 
I 2 3 4 5 6 
Veldig ofte 
7 
Dl 
D2 
D3 
D4 
D5 
D6 
5. Vennligst svar pa de folgende uttalelser ved a merke av et nummer fra 1 til 7 
basert pa folgende skala: 
l. Veldig sjelden 5. Ganske ofte 
2. Sjelden 6. Veldig ofte 
3. Av og til 7. Nesten bele tiden 
4. Noenganger 
Veldig Nesten 
sjelden bele tiden 
Jeg akter a overse visse arbeidsbeslektet aktiviteter 
bare fordi de ikke er sett over av ledelsen. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 El 
Jeg har justert data for a fremstille utforelsen min pa 
lik linje med min avdelings ma!. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 E2 
Nar jeg presenterer data til toppledelsen prnver jeg a 
unnga a vffire den som formidler darlige nyheter. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 E3 
Ogsa nar produktiviteten min er i uoverensstemmelse, 
prnver jeg fremdeles a la det virke konsekvent. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 E4 
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6. Vennligst indiker i hvilken grad du er enig eller uenig med f0lgende uttalelser. 
Vennligst svar ved a merke av et nummer fra l til 7 basert pa f0lgende skala: 
1. 
2. 
-3. 
4. 
Svc!:!rt uenig 
Moderat uenig 
Lite uenig 
Verken uenig eller enig 
5. 
6 .. 
7. 
Lite enig 
Moderat enig 
Svi!:!rt enig 
Svc!:!rt uenig 
Toppledelsen har nok informasjon ti! a ha kjennskap til 
Svc!:!rt enig 
avvik i et avdelingsbudsjett. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fl 
Toppledelsen mottar detaljert informasjon om aktiviteter 
for hver avdeling og hvert produkt. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 F2 
Toppledelsen har en mate a finne ut om der er avvik 
i et avdelingsbudsjett. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 F3 
Budsjetter utarbeidet for mitt ansvarsomrade er Jett 
oppnaelige. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Gt 
Budsjetter for mitt ansvarsomrade er ikke Sa!rlig 
krevende. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 G2 
Budsjettmal har ikke gitt meg un0dvendige bekymringer 
med a forbedre effektiviteten i mitt ansvarsomrade. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 G3 
Mal som er innarbeidet i mitt budsjett er vanskelige a 
oppna. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 G4 
I gode forretningstider er min overordnede villig til a 
akseptere et forsvarlig niva av avvik i mitt 
budsjett. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Ht 
A vvik i budsjettet er gunstig for a gj0re saker som 
ikke kan bli offisielt akseptert. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 H2 
For a forsvare seg, en ansvarlig leder tildeler budsjetter 
som kan forsvarlig oppnas. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 H3 
For a sikre seg, en ansvarlig leder setter to nivaer pa 
budsjettet: ett mellom han/hun selv og hans/hennes under-
ordnede, og en annen mellom ham/hun selv og hans/hennes 
overordnede. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 H4 
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7. Nevnt nedenfor er en del uttalelser som forstiller mulige felelser som individer 
kanskje bar overfor organisasjonen de arbeider for. Med hensyn ti1 dine fe lelser 
for organisasjonen du for tiden arbeider i, vennligst indiker i hvilken grad du 
er enig eller uenig med hver av de felgende uttalelser ved a merke av et 
nummer fra l lil 7 basert pa felgende skala: 
I. SvcErt uenig 5. Lite enig 
2. Moderat uenig 6. Moderat enig 
3. Lite uenig 7. SvcErt enig 
4. Verken uenig eller enig 
Sv.:ert uenig Svcert enig 
Jeg er villig til a gi mer enn vanligvis forventet for a 
hjelpe denne organisasjonen til a bli fremgangsrik. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 11 
Jeg snakker om denne organsisajonen til mine venner som 
en storartet organisasjon a arbeide for. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 12 
Jeg er sa og si villig til a akseptere hvilket som heist jobb 
oppdrag for a kunne fremdeles jobbe for denne 
organi sasj onen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 13 
Jeg betrakter mine verdier og denne organisasjonens verdier 
til a vcere svcert like. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 14 
Jeg er stolt over a kunne fortelle andre atjeg er en del av 
denne organisasjonen. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 15 
Jeg bryr meg virkelig om skjebnen til denne 
organsasjonen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 16 
For meg er dette den beste av alle mulig organisasjoner a 
arbeide for. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 17 
Denne organisasjonen inspirerer virkelig det beste ut av meg 
med hensyn ti! arbeidsutffrelse. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 18 
Jeg er virkelig glad for atjeg valgte a arbeide for denne 
organisasjonen overfor andre jeg vurderte dajeg hie 
medlem av denne organisasjonen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 19 
Du har na fullfsrt halvparten av dette skjemaet. 
Jeg er veldig takknemlig for hJelpen din. 
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8. Vennligst svar hvert spersmal ved a merke av et nummer fra 1 til 7 basert pa 
hver individuell skala: 
Ved sammenligning mea din overordnede, bvem er det som sitter med best informasjon om de 
aktivitetesom foretas i ditt ansvarsomrade? 
2 
Min overordnede 
bar mye bedre informasjon 
3 4 5 
Vi bar omtrent 
et samme kvalitet av informasjon 
6 7 Jl 
Jeg barmye 
bedre informasjon 
Ved sammenligning med din overordnede, bvem er mer kjent med inndata/utdata forboldet 
innarbeidet i de inteme funksjoner i ditt ansvarsomrade? 
2 
Min overordnede er 
mye bedre kjent 
3 4 
Vi er omtrent 
like mye kjent 
5 6 7 J2 
Jeger mye 
bedre kjent 
Ved sammenligning med din overordnede, bvem bar mer kjennskap til mulige utforelser i ditt 
ansvarsomrade? 
2 
Min overordnede bar 
mer kjennskap 
3 4 
Vi bar omtrent 
like mye kjennskap 
5 6 7 J3 
Jeg bar mye 
mer kjennskap 
Ved sammenligning med din overordnede, bvem bar mer teknisk kjennskap ti! arbeidet i ditt 
ansvarsomrade? 
2 
Min overordnede bar 
mer kjennskap 
3 4 5 
Vi bar omtrent 
like mye kjennskap 
6 7 J4 
Jeg bar mye 
mer kjennskap 
Ved sammenligning med din overordnede, bvem er bedre i stand ti! a vurdere mulig 
innvirkning pa dine aktiviteter pa punkter som er ekseteme i ditt ansvarsomrade? 
2 
Min overordnede er 
mye bedre i stand ti! 
3 4 
Vi er omtrent 
like mye i stand ti! 
5 6 7 JS 
Jeg ermye 
bedre i stand til 
Ved sammenligning med din overordnede, bvem bar bedre forstaelse for bva som kan bli 
oppnadd i ditt ansvarsomrade? 
2 
Min overordnede bar 
mye bedre forstaelse 
3 4 5 
Vi bar omtrent 
like mye forstaelse 
6 7 J6 
Jeg bar mye 
bedre forstaelse 
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9. Av og til sa feler alle seg Utt plaget av forskjellige saker i vart arbeid. Felgende er 
en liste av saker som noen ganger plager folk. Hvor ofte feler du deg plaget av hver 
av dem? Vennligst svar ved a merke av et nummer fra 1 til 7 basert pa felgende 
skala for hvert P'!_nkt. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Veldig sjelden 
Sjelden 
Av og til 
Noen ganger 
F0ler at du har for liten autoritet tit a utfore ansvaret 
som er gitt deg. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Usikker om hvilken rekkevidde og ansvar som er tilegnet 
jobben din. 
A ikke vite hvilke muligheter for forfremmelse 
eller opprykning som eksisterer for deg. 
A fole at arbeidsmengden er for stor for deg slik at det 
er umulig a fa gjort det i l0pet av en vanlig arbeidsdag. 
A fole at du er ikke i stand fit a tilfredsstille de 
Ganske ofte 
Veldig ofte 
Nesten hele tiden 
Veldig 
sjelden 
Nesten hele 
tiden 
2 3 4 5 6 7 Kl 
2 3 4 5 6 7 K2 
2 3 4 5 6 7 K3 
2 3 4 5 6 7 K4 
motsettende ettersp0rsler fra forskjellige folk over deg. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 K5 
A fole at du ikke er kvalifisert tit a gj0re jobben din. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 K6 
A ikke vite hva din overordnede mener om deg, 
hvordan han eller hun evaluerer utforselen din. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 K7 
Det faktum at du kan ikke fa nok informasjon til a utf0re 
jobben din. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 KS 
A matte bestemme ting som angar livet av individer, folk 
du kjenner. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 K9 
A fole at du kanskje ikke er likt og godkjent av folkene du 
arbeider med. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 KlO 
A fole seg ute av stand tit a influere din nrermeste 
overordnedes avgj0relser og handlinger som ber0rer deg. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 Kl 1 
A ikke vite av de folkene du arbeider med hva som ventes 
av deg. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Kl2 
A fole at arbeidsmengden din forstyrrer kvaliteten pa arbeidet. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 Kl3 
A fole at du ma gj fre l0pende saker som er imot din 
bed0mmelse. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Kl4 
A fole at jobben din har en tendens tit a forstyrre familie 
Iivet ditt. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 Kl5 
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10. Vennligst forestill deg en Idell jobb - se bort fra din naverende jobb. I valget av en 
idell jobb, av hvor stor betydning vii det vere for deg (vennligst merk av et nummer 
for hvert svar). 
I. 
2. 
3. 
Av stor betydning 
Av betydning 
Av moderat betydning 
4. 
5. 
Av stor 
Av liten betydning 
Av velding liten eller 
ingen betydning 
Av ingen 
betydning betydning 
Ha nok tid tit ditt personlige eller familie liv? 1 2 3 4 
Ha utfordrende oppgaver som vii gi deg en personlig 
tilfredshet? 1 2 3 4 
Ha gode fysiske arbeidsforhold (god ventilasjon og lys, 
passelig arbeidsplass, osv)? 1 2 3 4 
Ha tilstrekkelig frihet til a tilegne deg dine egne 
fremgangsmater til arbeidet? 1 2 3 4 
Ha treningsmuligheter (tit a forbedre dine ferdigheter 
eller a laere nye ferdigheter)? 1 2 3 4 
Fu lit ut bruke dine ferdigheter og muligheter pa jobben? 1 2 3 4 
11. Vennligst indiker i hvilken grad du er enig eller uenig med de f0lgende 
uttalelser. 
En organisasjons regler b0r ikke bli 
brutt, ogsa nar arbeidstakeren tror at 
det er for det beste for organisasjonen. 
Sterkt Sterkt 
enig Enig UbestemtUenig uenig 
2 3 4 5 
5 Ll 
5 L2 
5 L3 
5 L4 
5 L5 
5 L6 
Ml 
Hvor lenge tror du at du kommer tit a fortsette a arbeide for denne organisasjonen. Vennligst 
merk av. 
I. To ar pa det meste 3. Lengre enn 5 ar 
M2 
2. Fra to tit fem ar 4. Tit jeg pensjoneres 
Hvor ofte er du nerv0s eller anspent pa jobben? Vennligst merk av. 
I. Jeg foler alltid slik 4. Sjelden M3 
2. Vanligvis 5. Jeg foler aldri slik 
3. Noen ganger 
163 
12. Beskrivelsene nedenfor gjelder for fire forskjellige typer sjefer. Les gjennom 
disse beskrivelsene ferst: 
Sjef 1: 
Sjef2: 
Sjef3: 
Sjef 4: 
Tar vanligvis beslutninger omgaende og meddeler dem til underordnede 
klart og tydelig. Forventer dem til a utfore beslutningene med 
lojalitet og utena pa.fore problemer. 
Tar vanligvis beslutninger omgaende men for han/hun gar i gang, pr0Ver 
han/huna forklare dem fullstendig til underordnede. Gir dem forklaringer 
for bestemmelsene og svarer dem pa de sp0rsmalene de har. 
Radf0rer seg vanligvis med underordnede ffr de treffer beslutninger. 
H0rer pa deres rad, betrakter det og sa kunngj0rer belutningene. 
Forventer alle til a arbeide med lojalitet for a gjennomf0re det uansett om 
deter i samsvar med radet de ga. 
Samler vanligvis til et m01:e med underordnede nar der er en viktig 
beslutning som na tas. Framlegger problemet for gruppen og inviterer til 
diskusjon. Aksepterer majoritetens syn som beslutningen. 
Vennligst merk av det passende nummer. 
Na, for de typer sjefer, hvilken vii du foretrekke a arbeide for. 
I. 
2. 
Sjef 1 
Sjef2 
Og hvilken av de fire typer sjefer vii du si beskriver din sjef. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Sjef 1 
Sjef2 
Sjef3 
3. 
4. 
4. 
5. 
Sjef3 
Sjef 4 NI 
Sjef 4 
Passer ikke til 
noen av dem 
N2 
Hvor ofte, i ditt milj0, er underordnede engstelige for a uttrykke uenighet med engstelige 
for a uttrykke uenighet med deres overordnede? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Veldig ofte 
Ofte 
Noen ganger 
4. 
5. 
Sjelden 
Veldig sjelden 
N3 
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13. Vennligst svar de felgende spersmal. 
Organisasjonens navn -
(valgfritt):. _____________________ _ 
Lokalisering (land) av deres 
hovedkontor: 
---------------------
Nava!rende jobbtittel eller 
posisjon: ______________________ _ 
Hvor lenge har du va!rt i nava!rende 
posisjon? {rr 
Hvor mange a.rs erfaring har du i ditt nava!rendes 
ansvarsornrade? {rr 
Hvor mange ansatte er der i ditt 
ansvarsornrade? ca 
Hvor mange ansatte er der i din organisajon 
nasjonalt? ca 
H vor lenge har du bodd i dette 
landet? Ar 
F0dsels {rr? 19 
Hvilken nasjonalitet er du? _________ _ 
I hvilket land ble du 
f0dt? ________________________ _ 
Hva er din heyeste kvalifisering? 
I. 
2. 
3. 
Videregaende 
Heyskole 
Universitet 
4. Profesjonelle kvalifikasjoner 
5. Andre 
(Klargj0r) ____ _ 
Hvis du 0nsker A motta en kopi av det konkluderende resultat, vennligst fyll ut folgende: 
Navn: 
Adresse: ________________________________ _ 
Tusen takk for hjelpenr 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON BUDGETARY ENVIRONMENT 
All responses will be treated in strictest confidence. No one in your organisation will have 
access to your completed questionnaire. · 
Are budgets used in your organisation Yes D No 
If your answer is "No", please do not complete the rest of this questionnaire. Please return 
the uncompleted questionnaire to me in the enclosed envelope as soon as possible. 
If your answer is "Yes", please answer the rest of this questionnaire. 
1. When your superior (your immediate boss) is evaluating your performance, how 
much importance do you think he or she attaches to the following items? Please 
respond by circling a number from 1 to 7, based on the following scale, for each of 
the items listed below. 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Never important 
Seldom important 
Occasionally important 
Sometimes important 
How well I cooperate with my colleagues. 
My ability to meet budgeted targets in the 
short run. 
How well I get along with my superior. 
How much effort I put 
My concern with quality. 
My long run concern with costs and/or 
revenues. 
My attitude toward the work. 
My ability to handle my work force. 
My attitude toward the organisation. 
How well I cooperate with individuals 
outside the organisation (e.g. customers) 
Never 
5. 
6. 
7. 
important 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Often important 
Usually important 
Always important 
Always 
important 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
3 4 5 6 7 
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2. Indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the following questions about 
the relationship between your superior and yourself. Please circle a number from 
1 to 7 based on the following scale: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
To a very great extent 
To a great extent 
4. 
5. 
To a little extent 
To a very little extent 
To some extent 
To a very 
great extent 
Does your superior take advantage of opportunities 
that come up to further your interests by his actions 
and decisions? 
How free do you feel to discuss with your superior the 
problems and difficulties you have in your job without 
jeopardising your position or having it "held against" you? 
How confident do you feel that your superior keeps you fully 
and frankly informed about things that might concern you? 
Superiors at times must make decisions which seem to be against 
the interests of their subordinates. When this happens to you as a 
subordinate, how much trust do you have that your superior's 
decision is justified by other considerations? 
I 
I 
1 
To a very 
little extent 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
3. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following 
statement. Please circle a number from 1 to 7 based on the following scale: 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Strongly disagree 
Moderately disagree 
Mildly disagree 
Neutral 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Mildly agree 
Moderately agree 
Strongly agree 
You have learned from your experience during the past two 
years that you can trust the other members of top management. 
You and the other top managers openly express your differences 
and your feelings of encouragement or of disappointment. 
You and the others share all relevant infonnation and freely 
explore ideas and feelings that may be in or out of your defined 
responsibility. 
The result has been a high level of give and take and mutual 
confidence in each other's support and ability. 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
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4. The following items can be used to describe the role you play in the development 
of the budget for your area of responsibility. Please respond by circling form l to 
7 on the scale for each of the items. 
What is the extent of your involvement in the setting of your area of responsibility's budget? 
I am involved in setting: 
None of the budget 
l 2 3 4 
All of the budget 
5 6 7 
What is the extent of the reasoning given by your superior for revision to your budget? 
No reasoning Extensive reasoning 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How frequently do you give your opinions to your superior about the budget? 
Never Very frequently 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
What is the extent of your influence on the final budget for your area ofresponsibility. 
No influence Extensive influence 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
What is the degree of importance of your contribution to the budget? 
No importance Extensive importance 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How frequently are you asked for your opinions when the budget is being set by your? 
Never Very frequently 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Please respond by circling a number from l to 7, based on the following scale. 
1. Very rarely 5. Quite often 
2. Rarely 6. Very often 
3. Occasionally 7. Nearly all the time 
4. Sometimes 
Very Nearly all 
rarely the time 
I tend to ignore certain job-related activities simply 
because they are not monitored by management. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I have adjusted data to make my performance more 
in line with my department goals. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When presenting data to upper management, I try to 
avoid being the bearer of bad news. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Even if my productivity is inconsistent, I still try to make it 
appear consistent. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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6. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following 
statement. Please circle a number from 1 to 7 based on the following scale: 
I. Strongly disagree 5. Mildly agree 
2. Moderately disagree 6. Moderately agree 
3. Mildly disagree 7. Strongly agree 
4. Neutral 
Strongly Strongly 
disagree Neutral agree 
Top management has enough information to know 
if there is slack in a departmental budget. l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Top management receives detailed information on 
activities by department and by product. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Top management has a way of finding out if there is 
slack in a departmental budget. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Budgets set for my area of responsibility are safely 
attainable. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 ! 
Budgets for my area of responsibility are not 
1 
~ 
particularly demanding. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Budgetary targets have not caused me to be l 
particularly concerned with improving efficiency I in my area of responsibility. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Targets incorporated in my budget are difficult to I ,._ 
reach. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In good business times, my superior is willing to 
accept a reasonable level of slack in my budget. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Slack in the budget is good to do things that 
cannot be officially approved. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To protect himself/herself, a responsibility centre 
manager submits budgets that can safely be attained. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
To be safe, a responsibility centre manager sets two 
levels of budgets: one between himself/herself and 
his/her subordinates, and another between 
himself/herself and his/her superior. I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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7. Listed below are a series ofstatements that represent possible feelings that 
individuals might have about the organisation for which they work. With respect 
to your own feelings about the particular organisation for which you are now 
working, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement with each 
of the following statements by circling a number from 1 to 7 based on the 
following scale: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Strongly disagree 5. 
Moderately disagree 
Mildly disagree 
Neither disagree nor agree 
I am willing to put in a great deal of effort 
beyond that normally expected in order to 
help this organisation be successful. 
I talk up this organisation to my friends as a 
great organisation to work for. 
I would accept almost any type of job 
assignment in order to keep working for this 
organisation. 
I find that my values and this organisation's 
values are very similar. 
I am proud to tell others that I am part of this 
organisation. 
I really care about the fate of this organisation. 
For me, this is the best ofall possible 
organisations for which to work. 
This organisation really inspires the very best 
in me in the way of job performance. 
I am extremely glad that I chose this 
organisation to work for over others I was 
considering at the time I joined. 
Mildly agree 
6. Moderately agree 
7. Strongly agree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
YOU HAVE NOW COMPLETED HALF OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
I REALLY APPRECIATE YOU TIME IN HELPING ME 
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8. Please respond to each of the following questions by circling a number from 1 to 
7, based on their individual scales: 
In comparison with your superior, who is in possession of better information regarding the 
activities undertaken in your area ofresponsibility? 
2 
My superior 
has much better 
information 
3 4 
We have about 
the same quality 
of information 
5 6 7 
I have 
much better 
information 
In comparison with your superior, who is more familiar with the input-output relationships 
inherent in the internal operations of your area ofresponsibility? 
1 2 
My superior is 
much more familiar 
3 4 
we are about 
equally familiar 
5 6 7 
I am much 
more familiar 
In comparison with your superior, who is more certain of the performance potential of your 
area ofresponsibility? 
2 
My superior is 
much more certain 
3 4 
We are about 
equally certain 
5 6 7 
I am much 
more certain 
In comparison with your superior, who is more familiar technically with the work of your area 
ofresponsibility? 
2 
My superior is 
much more familiar 
3 4 
We are about 
equally familiar 
5 6 7 
I am much 
more familiar 
In comparison with your superior, who is better able to assess the potential impact on your 
activities of factors external to your area of responsibility? 
2 
My superior is 
much better able 
3 
We are about 
equally able 
4 5 6 7 
I am much 
better able 
In comparison with your superior, who has a better understanding of what cant be achieved in 
your area ofresponsibility? 
2 
My superior is 
a much better 
understanding 
3 4 
We have about 
the same 
understanding 
5 6 7 
I have a 
much better 
understanding 
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9. All of us occasionally feel bothered by certain kinds of things in our work. The 
following is a list of things that sometimes bother people. How frequently do you 
feel bothered by each of them? Please respond by circling a number from 1 to 7, 
based on the f?llowing scale. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Very rarely 
Rarely 
Occasionally 
Sometimes 
Feeling that you have too little authority to carry 
out the responsibilities assigned to you. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Being unclear on just what the scope and responsibilities 
of your job are. 
Not knowing what opportunities for advancement of 
promotion exist for you. 
Feeling that you have too heavy a work load, one that you 
can't possibly finish during an ordinary work day. 
Thinking that you'll not be able to satisfy the conflicting 
demands of various people over you. 
Feeling that you are not fully qualified to handle your job. 
Not knowing what your superior thinks of you, how he or 
she evaluates your performance. 
The fact that you can't get information needed to carry out 
your job. 
Having to decide things that affect the lives of individuals, 
people that you know. 
Feeling that you may not be liked and accepted by the 
people you work with. 
Feeling unable to influence your immediate superior's 
decisions and actions that affect you. 
Not knowing just what the people you work with expect 
of you. 
Thinking that the amount of work you have to do may 
interfere with how well it gets done. 
Feeling that you have to do things on the job that are 
against your better judgement. 
Feeling that your job tends to interfere with your family life. 
Quite often 
Very often 
Nearly all the time 
Very 
rarely 
Nearly all 
the time 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
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10. Please think of an ideal job - disregarding your present job. In choosing an ideal 
job, how important would it be to you (please circle one answer number in each 
line across): 
I. Ofutmost importance 4. Oflittle importance 
2. Very important 5. Of very little or no 
3. Of moderate importance importance 
Of utmost Ofno 
importance importance 
Have sufficient time left for your personal or family life? l 2 3 4 5 
Have challenging tasks to do, form which you can get a 
personal sense of accomplishment? I 2 3 4 5 
Have good physical working conditions (good ventilation 
and lighting, adequate work space, etc.)? I 2 3 4 5 
Have considerable freedom to adopt your own approach to 
the job? I 2 3 4 5 
Have training opportunities (to improve your skills or learn 
new skills)? I 2 3 4 5 
Fully use your skills and abilities on the job? I 2 3 4 5 
11. Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following 
statement: 
An organisation's rules should not be 
broken - even when the employee thinks 
it is in the organisation's best interests. 
Strongly Strongly 
agree Agree Undecided Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
How long do you think you will continue working for this organisation? Please circle. 
I . Two years at the most 
2. From two to five years 
3. 
4. 
More than 5 years (but I probable 
will leave before I retire) 
Until I retire 
How often do you feel nervous or tense at work? Please circle. 
Seldom I. 
2. 
3. 
I always feel this way 
Usually 
4. 
5. I never feel this way 
Sometimes 
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12. The descriptions below apply to four different types of managers. First, please read 
through these descriptions: 
Manager 1: Usually makes decisions promptly and communicates them to subordinates 
clearly and finnly. Expects them to carry out the decisions loyally and 
without raising difficulties. 
Manager 2: Usually makes decisions promptly, but, before going ahead, tries to 
explain them fully to subordinates. Gives them the reasons for the 
decisions and answers whatever questions they may have. 
Manager 3: Usually consults with subordinates before reaching decisions. Listens to 
their advice, considers it, and then announces decisions. Expects all to 
work loyally to implement it whether or not it is in accordance with the 
advice they gave. 
Manager 4: Usually calls a meeting of subordinates when there is an important 
decision to be made. Puts the problem before the group and invites 
discussion. Accepts the majority viewpoint as the decision. 
Please response by circling the appropriate number. 
Now, for the above types of managers, which one would you prefer to work under. 
I. 
2. 
Manager 1 
Manager2 
3. 
4. 
Manager3 
Manager4 
And, to which of the above four types of managers would you say your own superior most 
closely corresponds? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Manager 1 
Manager2 
Manager 3 
4. 
5. 
Manager4 
Does not correspond 
closely to any of them. 
How frequently, in your work environment, are subordinates afraid to express 
disagreement with their superiors? 
I. 
2. 
Very frequently 
Frequently 
3. Sometimes 
4. 
5. 
Seldom 
Very seldom 
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13. Please answer the following questions. 
Name oforganisation (Optionally): 
-------------------,--
Location (country of your head office: 
-----------------
Present job title or position: _____________________ _ 
How long have you been in this current 
position? ears 
How many years of experience do you have in your current area of 
responsibility? ears 
How many employees are there in your area of 
responsibility? approximately 
How many employees are there in your organisation 
nationally? approximately 
How long have you lived in this 
country? ears 
What is your year of birth? 19 
What is your nationally? _________ _ 
In which country were you 
born? 
---------------------------
What is your highest qualification? (Please circle the appropriate number). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Secondary school 
Vocational/Diploma Certificate 
University Degree 
4. 
5. 
Professional Qualifications 
Others 
(Specify) _____ _ 
If you wish to receive a copy of the summarised results, please fill in the following: 
Name: 
Address: ___________________________ _ 
Thank you very much for your time! 
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APPENDIXC 
This appendix contains: 
( 1) Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis and 
budgetary participation, (models 1 and 2). 
(2) Normal probability plot for the relationship between budgetary participation 
and trust, (model 1). 
(3) Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, 
budgetary participation, trust and propensity to create slack, (model 1 ). 
(4) Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis and 
budgetary participation, trust and job related tension, ( model 1 ). 
(5) Normal probability plot for the relationship between budgetary participation 
and organisational commitment, (model 2). 
(6) Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, 
budgetary participation, organisational commitment and propensity to create 
slack, (model 2). 
(7) Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, 
budgetary participation, organisational commitment and job related tension, 
(model 2). 
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis & 
budgetary participation (models 1 and 2). 
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budgetary participation and 
trust, (model 1) 
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation, trust and propensity to create slack, (model 1) 
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation, trust and job related tension, (model 1) 
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budgetary participation and 
organisational commitment, {model 2) 
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation, organisational commitment and propensity to create slack, (model 
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Normal probability plot for the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation, organisational commitment and iob related tension, (model 2) 
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APPENDIXD 
This appendix contains: 
( l) Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget 
emphasis and budgetary participation, (models l and 2). 
(2) Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between 
budgetary participation and trust, (model 1). 
(3) Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget 
emphasis, budgetary participation, trust and propensity to create slack, (model 
1 ). 
(4) Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget 
emphasis and budgetary participation, trust and job related tension, (model l ). 
(5) Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between 
budgetary participation and organisational commitment, (model 2). 
(6) Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget 
emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment and propensity 
to create slack, (model 2). 
(7) Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget 
emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment and job related 
tension,(model 2). 
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget 
emphasis & budgetary participation {models 1 and 2). 
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budgetary 
participation and trust, {model 1) 
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget 
emphasis, budgetary participation, trust and propensity to create slack, (model 1) 
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget 
emphasis, budgetary participation, trust and iob related tension, (model 1) 
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budgetary 
participation and organisational commitment, (model 2) 
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget 
emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment and propensity to 
create slack, (model 2) 
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Plot of residuals against predicted value for the relationship between budget 
emphasis, budgetary participation, organisational commitment and iob related 
tension, (model 2) 
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